Sunday, November 29, 2009

Washington Post: U.S. offers new role for Pakistan

U.S. offers new role for Pakistan

A broader partnership Importance of country to Afghan effort recognized

President Obama has offered Pakistan an expanded strategic partnership, including additional military and economic cooperation, while warning with unusual bluntness that its use of insurgent groups to pursue policy goals "cannot continue."

The offer, including an effort to help reduce tensions between Pakistan and India, was contained in a two-page letter delivered to President Asif Ali Zardari this month by Obama national security adviser James L. Jones. It was accompanied by assurances from Jones that the United States will increase its military and civilian efforts in Afghanistan and that it plans no early withdrawal.

Obama's speech Tuesday night at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, N.Y., will address primarily the Afghanistan aspects of the strategy. But despite the public and political attention focused on the number of new troops, Pakistan has been the hot core of the months-long strategy review. The long-term consequences of failure there, the review concluded, far outweigh those in Afghanistan.

"We can't succeed without Pakistan," a senior administration official involved in the White House review said. "You have to differentiate between public statements and reality. There is nobody who is under any illusions about this."

This official and others, all of whom spoke about the closely held details of the new strategy on the condition of anonymity, emphasized that without "changing the nature of U.S.-Pakistan relations in a new direction, you're not going to win in Afghanistan," as one put it. "And if you don't win in Afghanistan, then Pakistan will automatically be imperiled, and that will make Afghanistan look like child's play."

Proffered U.S. carrots, outlined during Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton's October visit to Islamabad, center on a far more comprehensive and long-term bilateral relationship. It would feature enhanced development and trade assistance; improved intelligence collaboration and a more secure and upgraded military equipment pipeline; more public praise and less public criticism of Pakistan; and an initiative to build greater regional cooperation among Pakistan, India and Afghanistan.

Obama called for closer collaboration against all extremist groups, and his letter named five: al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and the Pakistani Taliban organization known as Tehrik-e-Taliban. Using vague diplomatic language, he said that ambiguity in Pakistan's relationship with any of them could no longer be ignored.

Jones, a retired Marine Corps general, was more precise in conversations with top Pakistani government and military leaders, U.S. and foreign officials said, stating that certain things have to happen in Pakistan to ensure Afghanistan's security. If Pakistan cannot deliver, he warned, the United States may be impelled to use any means at its disposal to rout insurgents based along Pakistan's western and southern borders with Afghanistan.

Current U.S. policy includes the use of missiles fired from unmanned drones on insurgent locations limited to roughly 50 miles inside the western border; training in two military camps for the Pakistani Frontier Corps; and intelligence exchanges. It prohibits kinetic, or active, operations by U.S. ground forces inside Pakistan.

While praising Pakistani military offensives against groups that pose a domestic threat -- primarily the alliance of groups known as Tehrik-e-Taliban, in the Swat Valley and South Waziristan -- Jones made it clear that the administration expects more.

The rollout of the new strategy is being coordinated with principal U.S. allies, including Britain, whose prime minister, Gordon Brown, said Sunday, "People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught."

"Al-Qaeda has a base in Pakistan," Brown said in an interview with Sky News. "That base is still there -- they are able to recruit from abroad. The Pakistan authorities must convince us that they are taking all the action that is necessary to deal with that threat."

Expansion of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will require overcoming significant public and political mistrust in both countries. Officials said that they recognize the difficulty in delivering on either U.S. promises or threats, and that "our leverage over Pakistan is very limited," the senior administration official said.

At the same time, although the administration's goal is to demonstrate a new level and steadfastness of support, short-term U.S. demands may threaten Pakistan's already fragile political stability.

"It's going to be a game of cat-and-mouse with them for a while," another official said, adding that "what we're trying to do is to force them to recalculate" where their advantage lies.

The Pakistan strategy is complicated by a number of factors, including the fact that any indication of increased U.S. involvement there generates broad mistrust. Zardari's political weakness is an additional hazard for a new bilateral relationship. He is disliked by the military and is challenged by the political opposition and his own prime minister; he also remains under a cloud of long-standing corruption charges. Less than a third of Pakistan's population voices approval for him in polls. Obama is even less popular there, with approval ratings in the low double digits.

Many of the broad powers that Zardari assumed from his predecessor, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a 1999 military coup and was forced to resign last year, are being whittled away. On Friday, Zardari turned over control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal to Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, who is held in much higher favor by the military.

Zardari's Musharraf-era powers to fire the elected government and appoint top military officials are also under challenge, and a law protecting government officials from corruption prosecution expired Saturday. On Sunday, the leading political opposition group called for him to give up the additional powers, and Zardari, who had pledged to do so, said he will act "soon." The administration expects Zardari's position to continue to weaken, leaving him as a largely ceremonial president even if he manages to survive in office.

Senior U.S. officers, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Adm. Mike Mullen, have made repeated relationship-building trips to Pakistan, and training programs in this country for Pakistani officers are expanding after being moribund for years.

U.S. officials have long referred to Pakistani military and intelligence officers who are sympathetic to or actively support insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan as "rogue elements." More recently, they have described those relationships as more direct and institutional within a divided military. "For the things that we care about," a U.S. official said, "the real decision-maker is the military." It has long been hedging its bets in Afghanistan; the military has positioned itself to prevent inroads by India in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, and against a 30-year history of being used and then rejected by shifting U.S. policy aims.

"Our game is to convince them that our commitment to Afghanistan and the region is long-term," the official said of the military. "We're not going to pack up our bags and leave them as soon as we're done. We have to create a situation in which they see a much more positive interest in closer relations with us than they do in trying to play us. But it requires time."

India is skeptical of any U.S. involvement in its relationship with Pakistan. Bilateral attempts to resolve the long-standing border dispute in Kashmir were put on hold after last year's terrorist attacks in Mumbai, which were blamed on Lashkar-e-Taiba.

The group has long been active in the Kashmir conflict and is said to have close ties to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency.

Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh treaded carefully on the issue in public during Singh's state visit to Washington last week. "It is not the place of the United States to try to, from the outside, resolve all those conflicts," Obama said during their news conference here. "On the other hand, we want to be encouraging of ways in which both India and Pakistan can feel secure."

Times Online: You’ve had eight years, now get us bin Laden, Brown urges Pakistan

You’ve had eight years, now get us bin Laden, Brown urges Pakistan

Gordon Brown told Pakistan to “take out” Osama bin Laden yesterday as Western frustration at its failure to capture the al-Qaeda leader burst into the public glare.

With America and Britain seeking support for their decisions in the next two days to send tens of thousands more troops to Afghanistan, Mr Brown told the Pakistani leadership that it had not done enough to catch the men — believed to be hiding in the north of the country — responsible for the September 11 attacks.

His criticism was aimed at the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, which the West has long believed to be too close to extremist groups harbouring bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Mr Brown told President Asif Ali Zardari in a telephone call on Saturday that he intended to press home the message on Thursday when Yousuf Raza Gilani, the Pakistani Prime Minister, visits London.

About 30,000 Pakistani troops are in the lawless South Waziristan region to force out the Taleban. In interviews as he returned from the Commonwealth summit, Mr Brown made clear that he wanted them also to target the leadership of al-Qaeda, which has evaded international forces since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.

Mr Brown said: “We have got to focus the attention of the world on the continuing threat from al-Qaeda. Three quarters of terrorist plots that threaten Britain arise from that area of Pakistan.

“I believe that, after eight years, we should have been able to do more . . . to get to the bottom of where al-Qaeda is operating from. I want to make sure that the Pakistani Army and Pakistani security services, as well as the Pakistani politicians, will make sure that in South Waziristan we are taking on al-Qaeda directly. We want to see more progress in taking out these top two people in al-Qaeda who have done so much damage and are clearly behind many of the operations in Great Britain.”

In a stronger broadside he added: “We have got to ask ourselves why, eight years after September 11, nobody has been able to spot or detain or get close to Osama bin Laden. Nobody has been able to get close to Zawahiri, the No 2 in al-Qaeda. And we have got to ask the Pakistan authorities and security services, army and politicians, to join us in the major effort the world is committing resources to, not only to isolate al-Qaeda, but to break them in Pakistan.

“If we are putting our strategy into place, Pakistan has to show that it can take on al-Qaeda.”

Mr Brown’s intervention upset Pakistan. A Foreign Ministry official said that, according to their intelligence, bin Laden was in Afghanistan, not Pakistan. “If the US or Britain have information about him being in Pakistan they should share it,” he said.

Wajid Shamsul Hasan, the Pakistani High Commissioner in London, said that his country’s fight against the Taleban had resulted in many losses. “We are doing what we can. We have carried out two very big military operations at enormous cost to the country.”

He added: “The people of Pakistan want its allies to do more. If you provide us with equipment and expertise we will be able to be more successful — we are successful, but more successful — in tracking down the al-Qaeda leadership.”

Mr Brown will hold a video conference with President Obama today to discuss their troop announcements. The Prime Minister will criticise Pakistan later in a Commons statement confirming that an extra 500 British troops will be sent to Afghanistan, bringing the total to 9,500.

On Tuesday Mr Obama will say that more than 30,000 extra American troops will be sent. He, too, will refer to Pakistan, although officials said that Mr Brown’s message was his own, rather than a co-ordinated one.

Sources close to Mr Brown said that he had gone public because it was time for Pakistan to “step up to the plate”. “He and America have made demands on Karzai. He has organised the London conference [on the future of Afghanistan]. He has made demands on other allies to put up another 5,000 troops. Now it is time for Pakistan to be told openly that it has not come up to the mark.”

Mr Brown announced the international conference, to be held in London on January 28, at which Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, will be asked to commit himself to milestones for beefing up his army, police and local governance to prepare for the district-by-district transition of power in the country’s 34 provinces.

Mr Karzai will be expected to commit himself to benchmarks for providing 50,000 additional troops for training, improving the capacity of the police force and putting in place governors at regional and district level who are free from corruption and can deliver services and security to Afghans.

Liam Fox, the Shadow Defence Secretary, told BBC One’s Politics Show: “Our biggest problem with Pakistan is getting the Pakistan Government to focus on dealing with not just the Pakistan Taleban but the Afghan Taleban.Pakistan has a number of problems: it has basic economic problems; it has got endemic political problems; it has got the fact that its military tends to face towards India and is prepared for state-on-state conflict and does not really have the capabilities for the sort of anti-terrorist measures that we want.

“The international community has to give Pakistan a lot of help if Pakistan is to fulfil the role we want it to do.”

New York Times: Britain Presses Pakistan and Afghanistan on Militants (Osama bin Laden)

“The Pakistan government has started to take on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in South Waziristan,” Mr. Brown said, referring to a Pakistani military offensive that has been under way in recent weeks. “But we have to ask ourselves why, eight years after Sept. 11, nobody has been able to spot or detain or get close to Osama bin Laden, nobody has been able to get close to Zawahri, the No. 2 in Al Qaeda.”

Britain Presses Pakistan and Afghanistan on Militants

LONDON — Highlighting themes likely to be taken up by President Obama in his military policy speech on Tuesday, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain has demanded that Afghanistan and Pakistan match plans for increased allied troop levels in Afghanistan by taking tough actions of their own, including, in Pakistan, a stepped-up effort to capture Osama bin Laden.

In two hard-edged statements over the weekend, Mr. Brown signaled a renewed sense of impatience in the approach that Britain and the United States plan to take toward the governments in Kabul and Islamabad as the allies step up their commitment to the war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

In recent days, American officials have been briefing allied leaders in Europe, including Mr. Brown, on what President Obama plans to say at West Point on Tuesday. Mr. Brown has said he will move this week to announce fresh British deployments, confirming a tentative announcement last month of Britain’s readiness to increase its force by 500 troops, beyond the 9,000 already deployed.

On the fate of Mr. bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, Mr. Brown, speaking Sunday, offered a sharp jolt to Pakistan. Western intelligence officials concluded long ago that the Qaeda leaders had taken sanctuary in the largely lawless tribal areas of Pakistan abutting Afghanistan, most likely in North or South Waziristan, barely 200 miles from Islamabad.

“The Pakistan government has started to take on the Taliban and Al Qaeda in South Waziristan,” Mr. Brown said, referring to a Pakistani military offensive that has been under way in recent weeks. “But we have to ask ourselves why, eight years after Sept. 11, nobody has been able to spot or detain or get close to Osama bin Laden, nobody has been able to get close to Zawahri, the No. 2 in Al Qaeda.”

Mr. Brown left unstated what has been a common assumption among Western governments dealing with Pakistan on the issue of Islamic extremism: that powerful elements of the government in Islamabad, including its military intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence, have been following a two-track policy, accepting billions of dollars in Western aid on the pledge of fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda while covertly assisting them, or at least avoiding confronting them.

But the British leader said he would be making Pakistan’s willingness to make an unqualified commitment to the war with the extremists a test of future support. In the next few days, he said, he will be talking with Pakistan’s leaders “and saying, if we are putting a strategy into place for building up the Afghan armed forces so that they can control things themselves, then Pakistan has got to be able to show that it can take on Al Qaeda, which is a threat to the Pakistan government and the Pakistan people as well as the rest of the world.”

Mr. Brown made his remarks in Trinidad, where he was attending the annual meeting of Commonwealth government leaders. He used the occasion to lay the groundwork for an international conference on Afghanistan in London that Britain and the United States, along with other parties to the war, have agreed to hold on Jan. 28, with the objective of laying down a charter for the war’s future conduct and, especially, for exacting commitments from the government of President Hamid Karzai.

On Afghanistan, Mr. Brown said Saturday that Mr. Karzai, whose leadership has been sharply criticized in London and Washington in recent weeks, will face demands “to match the military push that is going to take place in Afghanistan with a political push forward.”

The British leader spoke of benchmarks that would be set for the Afghan leader, including a three-month deadline to “identify” additional Afghan troops to be sent for training in Helmand Province, the hottest zone of the war. In effect, Western leaders appear to be giving notice to Mr. Karzai that they will not accept further delays or half-measures on building the Afghan Army and the police to the point where Afghans can assume primary responsibility for fighting the war.

Mr. Brown said an additional requirement would be a nine-month deadline for Mr. Karzai to appoint 400 provincial and district governors, fulfilling his promise to rid provincial and local administrations of officials who are corrupt, involved in drug-dealing or engaged in covert support of the Taliban.

New York Times: A Defiant Iran Details Plan for 10 Enrichment Plants


A Defiant Iran Details Plan for 10 Enrichment Plants

WASHINGTON — Iran angrily refused Sunday to comply with a demand by the United Nations nuclear agency to cease work on a once-secret nuclear fuel enrichment plant, and escalated the confrontation by declaring it would construct 10 more such plants.

The response to the demand came as Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, said his cabinet would also order a study of what it would take for Iran to further enrich its existing stockpile of nuclear fuel for use in a medical reactor — rather than rely on Russia or another nation, as agreed to in an earlier tentative deal.

It is unclear how long it would take Iran to enrich the fuel to the levels needed for the medical reactor, or whether it has the technology to fabricate that fuel into a form that could be put into the reactor. But the declaration appeared intended to convince the West that Iran was prepared to move closer to bomb-grade quality, while stopping short of crossing that threshold.

Even if Iran proceeded with a plan to build 10 enrichment plants, it is doubtful Iran could execute that plan for years, maybe decades. But the announcement drew immediate condemnation from the White House, which hoped Iran’s defiant tone would help persuade Russia and China that imposing harsh sanctions was justified.

Both countries, historically opposed to sanctions, had voted in favor of a resolution by the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear watchdog, demanding that Iran stop work on a formerly secret enrichment plant. By refusing to accept that resolution, one senior administration official said, “Ahmadinejad may be doing more to assemble a sanctions coalition than we could do in months of work.”

The White House spokesman, Robert Gibbs, said of Iran’s declaration: “If true, this would be yet another serious violation of Iran’s clear obligations under multiple U.N. Security Council resolutions, and another example of Iran choosing to isolate itself.”

According to Iranian state television, Mr. Ahmadinejad’s cabinet voted to begin construction at five new sites designated for uranium enrichment plants — it did not specify where — and to determine locations for another five in the next few months.

In Europe, diplomats called the Iranian plan for a giant expansion of enrichment closer to a national aspiration than an imminent threat. Iran’s main enrichment facility, at Natanz, began early this decade and today the country has installed fewer than a tenth of the 50,000 centrifuges it is designed to handle. A second, once-secret plant — revealed two months ago — has been under construction for more than three years, and it is still at least a year from completion.

“It’s preposterous,” a diplomat in Vienna who collaborates with the International Atomic Energy Agency said of the plan for the 10 plants. The diplomat added: “It would be way, way more than they need no matter what their nuclear aspirations.” He noted that the United States had just one enrichment plant, in Paducah, Ky.

But the threat appeared to represent Iran’s decision to find a way to strike back politically at the West for the Security Council’s three resolutions demanding that it stop all enrichment activity. The atomic agency’s board built on those Security Council resolutions on Friday, when it demanded that Iran halt work on building its second enrichment plant. It was the first time the agency had told Iran to halt construction of a plant.

What American and atomic agency officials fear is that the steady drumbeat of defiant declarations from Iran could lead to the one act that would truly touch off a crisis: Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. That would terminate the already limited presence of the West’s atomic inspectors in Iran. North Korea took that step in early 2003, and soon produced the fuel for eight or more nuclear weapons; it has since tested two.

More than 200 members of the Iranian Parliament signed a letter on Sunday, according to Iranian press accounts, urging that the atomic agency’s presence in Iran be further restricted, and individual political leaders have called for withdrawal from the nonproliferation treaty.

But Iran may be hesitant to follow North Korea’s lead. Such a declaration would signal to the world that Iran was heading for “nuclear breakout,” a rush to produce a bomb. It also would almost certainly build pressure for sanctions, and could lead to pre-emptive military action by Israel. “You have to think,” one of President Obama’s top national security advisers said recently, “that they would think twice before denouncing their treaty obligations.”

Instead, the speaker of Iran’s Parliament, Ali Larijani warned Sunday that Iran’s cooperation with the agency could “seriously decrease” in the near future.

Tehran says its nuclear program is peaceful, and to date has enriched uranium to a relatively low grade, consistent with making fuel for a civilian nuclear power plant. But so far, there are no civilian nuclear plants under construction to receive that fuel; the two plants Iran is getting ready to open, at Bushehr, receive fuel from Russia. The absence of civilian reactors is one reason Western analysts suspect that Iran’s real intentions are to make atom bombs.

Iran has long talked of building as many as 19 more nuclear plants in addition to the complex at Bushehr. In the past, the plan for a total of 20 power plants resulted in a large gap between Iran’s declared ambitions and its envisioned needs for enrichment, and Sunday’s announcement sought to end that contradiction, at least in theory.

Western nuclear experts said that taking the declaration of the 10-plant goal at face value was akin to believing in the tooth fairy. “They’re hyping it,” said David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that tracks nuclear proliferation. “They couldn’t build that number of centrifuges. They don’t have the infrastructure.” Mr. Albright added that Iran’s supplies of uranium were dwindling, casting more doubt on the vastly expanded commercial fuel goal. The result, he said, is that the new push for enrichment will probably end up producing “one small plant somewhere that they’re not going to tell us about” and be military in nature.

New York Times: Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan to Envision Exit (Pakistan-Can't Make Too Many Public Demands, etc.)


...“We agree that no matter how many troops you send, if the safe haven in Pakistan isn’t cracked, the whole mission is compromised,” said one official who has participated in the debate over the strategy. “But if you make too many demands on the Pakistanis in public, it can backfire.”

...On Sunday, one of the Obama administration’s staunchest allies, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain, joined in the campaign to press Pakistan to step up attacks on Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan’s unruly tribal areas and other militant groups there. “People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught,” Mr. Brown told Sky News, “and what can the Pakistan authorities do that is far more effective.”


Obama’s Speech on Afghanistan to Envision Exit


WASHINGTON — President Obama plans to lay out a time frame for winding down the American involvement in the war in Afghanistan when he announces his decision this week to send more forces, senior administration officials said Sunday.

Although the speech was still in draft form, the officials said the president wanted to use the address at the United States Military Academy at West Point on Tuesday night not only to announce the immediate order to deploy roughly 30,000 more troops, but also to convey how he intends to turn the fight over to the Kabul government.

“It’s accurate to say that he will be more explicit about both goals and time frame than has been the case before and than has been part of the public discussion,” said a senior official, who requested anonymity to discuss the speech before it is delivered. “He wants to give a clear sense of both the time frame for action and how the war will eventually wind down.”

The officials would not disclose the time frame. But they said it would not be tied to particular conditions on the ground nor would it be as firm as the current schedule for withdrawing troops in Iraq, where Mr. Obama has committed to withdrawing most combat units by August and all forces by the end of 2011.

Officials of one allied nation who have been extensively briefed on the president’s plan said, however, that Mr. Obama would describe how the American presence would be ratcheted back after the buildup, while making clear that a significant American presence in Afghanistan would remain for a long while. That is designed in part to signal to Pakistan that the United States will not abandon the region and to allay Pakistani fears that India will fill the vacuum created as America pulls back.

Some leading members of Congress talked publicly Sunday about their hope that the president would explain an endgame for American involvement in the eight-year war that includes how Afghans will assume more of their security needs.

But more hawkish Republicans cautioned that setting a deadline for withdrawal could signal a lack of resolve to allies, including Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Talk of an exit strategy is exactly the wrong way to go,” said Senator Jon Kyl, an Arizona Republican. “I certainly hope the president doesn’t do that, because all that does is signal to the enemies and also to our allies, to the folks in Pakistan as well as the Afghanis, that we’re not there to stay until the mission is accomplished.” He spoke on “Fox News Sunday.”

Senior lawmakers also warned the White House on Sunday that its expected troop buildup in Afghanistan would fail unless the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan did more to combat militants attacking American forces, a concern that administration officials concede is a major vulnerability in President Obama’s new war strategy.

“The key here is an Afghan surge, not an American surge,” Senator Carl Levin, a Michigan Democrat who heads the Armed Services Committee, said on CBS’s “Face the Nation.” “And if the president lays out the case for why our combat forces that are going particularly to the south will increase the speed-up of the Afghan Army, it seems to me that that would be very, very important.”

With the cost of the war rising, some Democrats have even talked of a surtax. And a Republican senator, Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, asked: “If we were talking about several years of time, how many more years beyond that? What is the capacity of our country to finance this particular type of situation as opposed to other ways of fighting Al Qaeda and the war against terror?”

At West Point, Mr. Obama was expected to describe commitments from Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, and specific benchmarks his government must meet: to crack down on corruption, deploy well-trained Afghan troops and police officers, and focus on development in one of the world’s poorest nations. Mr. Obama was expected to be far less specific about Pakistan, where Taliban leaders are commanding operations across the border against American forces, and where Al Qaeda’s central leadership still lives.

“We agree that no matter how many troops you send, if the safe haven in Pakistan isn’t cracked, the whole mission is compromised,” said one official who has participated in the debate over the strategy. “But if you make too many demands on the Pakistanis in public, it can backfire.”

The problems in Afghanistan have only been compounded by the fragility of Mr. Obama’s partner in Pakistan, President Asif Ali Zardari, who is so weak that his government seems near collapse. On Friday, Mr. Zardari relinquished his position in Pakistan’s nuclear command structure, turning it over to the prime minister, in what appeared to be an effort to avoid impeachment or prosecution, and retain at least a figurehead post.

On Sunday, one of the Obama administration’s staunchest allies, Prime Minister Gordon Brown of Britain, joined in the campaign to press Pakistan to step up attacks on Al Qaeda’s leadership in Pakistan’s unruly tribal areas and other militant groups there. “People are going to ask why, eight years after 2001, Osama bin Laden has never been near to being caught,” Mr. Brown told Sky News, “and what can the Pakistan authorities do that is far more effective.”

White House officials have said relatively little about the Pakistan side of the administration’s evolving war strategy, in part because they have so few options and so little leverage. They cannot send troops into Pakistan, and they cannot talk publicly about one of their most effective measures, the Central Intelligence Agency’s Predator drone strikes in the country.

“Everyone understands this is a complex, nuanced, critical relationship,” said a senior American official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because Mr. Obama’s review had not been announced. “Everyone has their eyes open, and there are genuine concerns. But one focus now is on trying to expand cooperation. The Pakistanis are doing some positive things in the tribal areas. That presents opportunities on which to build.”

Mr. Obama’s advisers previously signaled that the president wanted to outline, as he had before, expectations for the Afghan government. This time, they said, the goals would be more explicit and demanding, aimed at improving governance and curbing corruption.

But the advisers have been debating whether to put deadlines on those benchmarks, like the pace of training Afghan security forces to defend their country.

Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top NATO and American commander in Afghanistan, is expected to testify about Mr. Obama’s new strategy on Dec. 8 to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees in Washington, the official said. His appearance is expected to follow Congressional testimony later this week by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton and Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The administration has sought to build consensus among crucial allies to reach this point. In the last two weeks, Mr. Obama dispatched two top aides to Pakistan to deliver the same message: Keep the pressure on.

In separate visits to Islamabad, the capital, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Leon E. Panetta, and the president’s national security adviser, Gen. James L. Jones, told Pakistani officials that no matter how many more troops the president sent to Afghanistan, the effort would fail unless Pakistan increased strikes against Al Qaeda’s leadership and Mullah Muhammad Omar and the leadership of the Afghan Taliban in the southern Pakistani city of Quetta, and the Haqqani network, militants operating out of North Waziristan who have attacked Afghan and NATO targets in eastern Afghanistan and Kabul, the Afghan capital.

Saturday, November 28, 2009

New York Times: Afghans Offer Jobs to Taliban Rank and File if They Defect

Afghans Offer Jobs to Taliban Rank and File if They Defect

JALALABAD, Afghanistan — The American-backed campaign to persuade legions of Taliban gunmen to stop fighting got under way here recently, in an ornate palace filled with Afghan tribal leaders and one very large former warlord leading the way.

“O.K., I want you guys to go out there and persuade the Taliban to sit down and talk,” Gul Agha Shirzai, the governor of Nangarhar Province, told a group of 25 tribal leaders from four eastern provinces. In a previous incarnation, Mr. Shirzai was the American-picked governor of Kandahar Province after the Taliban fell in 2001.

“Do whatever you have to do,” the rotund Mr. Shirzai told the assembled elders. “I’ll back you up.”

After about two hours of talking, Mr. Shirzai and the tribal elders rose, left for their respective provinces and promised to start turning the enemy.

The meeting is part of a battlefield push to lure local fighters and commanders away from the Taliban by offering them jobs in development projects that Afghan tribal leaders help select, paid by the American military and the Afghan government.

By enlisting the tribal leaders to help choose the development projects, the Americans also hope to help strengthen both the Afghan government and the Pashtun tribal networks.

These efforts are focusing on rank-and-file Taliban; while there are some efforts under way to negotiate with the leaders of the main insurgent groups, neither American nor Afghan officials have much faith that those talks will succeed soon.

Afghanistan has a long history of fighters switching sides — sometimes more than once. Still, efforts so far to persuade large numbers of Taliban fighters to give up have been less than a complete success. To date, about 9,000 insurgents have turned in their weapons and agreed to abide by the Afghan Constitution, said Muhammad Akram Khapalwak, the chief administrator for the Peace and Reconciliation Commission in Kabul.

But in an impoverished country ruined by 30 years of war, tribal leaders said that many more insurgents would happily put down their guns if there was something more worthwhile to do.

“Most of the Taliban in my area are young men who need jobs,” said Hajji Fazul Rahim, a leader of the Abdulrahimzai tribe, which spans three eastern provinces. “We just need to make them busy. If we give them work, we can weaken the Taliban.”

In the Jalalabad program, tribal elders would reach out to Taliban commanders to press them to change sides. The commanders and their fighters then would be offered jobs created by local development programs.

The Pashtuns, who form the core of the Taliban, make up a largely tribal society, with families connected to one another by kinship and led by groups of elders. Over the years, the Pashtun tribes have been substantially weakened, with elders singled out by three groups: Taliban fighters, the rebels who fought the former Soviet Union and the soldiers of the former Soviet Union itself. The decimation of the tribes has left Afghan society largely atomized.

Afghan and American officials hope that the plan to make peace with groups of Taliban fighters will complement an American-led effort to set up anti-Taliban militias in many parts of the country: the Pashtun tribes will help fight the Taliban, and they will make deals with the Taliban. And, by so doing, Afghan tribal society can be reinvigorated.

“We’re trying to put pressure on the leaders, and at the same time peel away their young fighters,” said an American military official in Kabul involved in the reconciliation effort. “This is not about handing bags of money to an insurgent.”

The Afghan reconciliation plan is intended to duplicate the Awakening movement in Iraq, where Sunni tribal leaders, many of them insurgents, agreed to stop fighting and in many cases were paid to do so. The Awakening contributed to the remarkable decline in violence in Iraq.

In the autumn of 2001, during the opening phase of the American-led war in Afghanistan, dozens of warlords fighting for the Taliban agreed to defect to the American-backed rebels. As in Iraq, the defectors were often enticed by cash, sometimes handed out by American Army Special Forces officers.

At a ceremony earlier this month in Kabul, about 70 insurgents laid down their guns before the commissioners and agreed to accept the Afghan Constitution. Some of the men had fought for the Taliban, some for Hezb-i-Islami, another insurgent group. The fighters’ motives ranged from disillusion to exhaustion.

“How long should we fight the government? How many more years?” said Molawi Fazullah, a Taliban lieutenant who surrendered with nine others. “Our leaders misled us, and we destroyed our country.”

Like many fighters who gave up at the ceremony, he shrouded his face with a scarf and sunglasses, for fear of being identified by his erstwhile comrades.

The Americans say they have no plans to give cash to local Taliban commanders. They say they would rather give them jobs.

In a defense appropriations bill recently approved by Congress, lawmakers set aside $1.3 billion for a program known by its acronym, CERP, a discretionary fund for American officers. Ordinarily, CERP money is used for development projects, but the language in the bill says officers can use the money to support the “reintegration into Afghan society” of those who have given up fighting.

For all the efforts under way to entice Taliban fighters to change sides, there will always be the old-fashioned approach: deadly force. American commanders also want to squeeze them; such is the rationale behind Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal’s request for tens of thousands of additional American troops.

Indeed, sometimes force alone does the trick. On Oct. 9, American Special Forces soldiers killed Ghulam Yahia, an insurgent commander believed responsible for, among other things, sending several suicide bombers into the western city of Herat. Mr. Yahia had changed sides himself in the past: earlier in the decade, he was Herat’s mayor.

When the Americans killed Mr. Yahia, in a mountain village called Bedak, 120 of his fighters defected to the Afghan government. Others went into hiding. Abdul Wahab, a former lieutenant of Mr. Yahia’s who led the defectors, said that the Afghan government had so far done nothing to protect them or offer them jobs. But he said he was glad he had made the jump anyway.

“We are tired of war,” he said. “We don’t want it anymore.”

Wednesday, November 25, 2009

Los Angeles Times (LATimes): U.S. intelligence chief in Afghanistan wages battle for resources

Flynn believes the military needs a different approach to gathering intelligence about insurgents and their networks. When attacked, insurgents move, regroup and talk -- all information that can be collected and used to build a complete picture of the enemy.

Traditionally, commanders used intelligence to plan military operations.

"Now we do the opposite," Flynn said. "We do the ops to get the intel."

U.S. intelligence chief in Afghanistan wages battle for resources

Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn encounters military resistance in his task of overhauling U.S. intelligence-gathering in Afghanistan to boost efforts to defeat the Taliban.

Reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan - The peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains create a stunning backdrop for the U.S. military's Kabul headquarters, but Maj. Gen. Michael T. Flynn rarely notices. Sheltering Taliban fighters and American combat outposts, the mountains symbolize the old way of fighting. Flynn was sent here to help define a new strategy for the war.

In a teleconference center at the military complex, Flynn sat before a microphone, pressing his case for more Predator drones, intelligence analysts and satellites to peer beyond those peaks. An ocean away in the United States, a senior officer seemed to be dragging his heels, unwilling to reassign the assets.

Flynn knows the United States needs better intelligence to bolster its troubledeffort to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, but often he feels frustrated that others do not share his sense of urgency. He listened to the senior officer, peering incredulously over his glasses. He muted the microphone, then exploded, unleashing a torrent of profanity. "Come on guys, get your [expletive] together!" he yelled.

Flynn's boss, Army Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top U.S. and allied commander, has ordered an overhaul of how intelligence is collected, disseminated and, most of all, used by troops in Afghanistan.

McChrystal arrived in June, relatively unknown outside military circles. He has gained a high profile in the bruising policy debates of Washington, in part because of his request for more troops, on which President Obama is expected to announce a decision next week. Less visible are the commanders McChrystal has promoted to oversee the conflict.

Chief among them is Flynn, 50, a longtime McChrystal colleague who is charged with carrying out the commander's vision of remaking a military establishment -- one that has historically admonished officers to "stay in your lane" -- into a more nimble and less hierarchical organization.

"He doesn't stay in his lane," McChrystal said of Flynn. "He never asks, 'Why can't we do this?' He just busts down walls."

A former top intelligence officer for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Flynn knows well the importance of spy data and analysis. As McChrystal's most important advisor, his influence extends much further. Among military officials in the Pentagon, he has become known as the "chief operating officer" of the Afghanistan war.

McChrystal has made protecting Afghan civilians the military's top priority. According to military theory, the safer people feel, the less likely they are to support insurgents. As a result, learning about militant groups, in many cases, has become more important than destroying them.

Flynn believes the military needs a different approach to gathering intelligence about insurgents and their networks. When attacked, insurgents move, regroup and talk -- all information that can be collected and used to build a complete picture of the enemy.

Traditionally, commanders used intelligence to plan military operations.

"Now we do the opposite," Flynn said. "We do the ops to get the intel."

In meeting after meeting, Flynn cajoles, badgers and pesters fellow officers to get moving on initiatives such as sharing information with Afghan leaders and overhauling intelligence collection.

Flynn is known for subjecting subordinates to withering barrages of questions and demands. He pushes people to think beyond their narrow assignment and take greater responsibility. A military officer who served with the general on several assignments described the experience as "the Flynn roller-coaster. You had to strap in and ride it out."

For the U.S. military, the change is unsettling and not altogether welcome. Some find it reassuring to know the limits of their responsibilities and duties. As Flynn tries to push through changes, testing those limits, a large military bureaucracy often is ready to push back.

In the secure video teleconference, the officer who must approve Flynn's requests represented one such roadblock. When Flynn's temper subsided, he flicked the microphone on once more and launched into something of a sermon.

"The problems we have are not insignificant," he said in a voice that bears a New England accent. "The problems are not ones that have developed in the last 90 days. They have grown over the last nine years."

To solve the problem will take creative thinking, Flynn said. But it is also going to require more resources -- quickly, he stressed.

"We have a shift in our major effort not because Gen. [David] Petraeus said so. And not because Secretary [Robert] Gates said so," Flynn said. "But because the president of the United States has said so."

Flynn prevailed. The command in Afghanistan received an initial increase in the number of Predators and other spy planes, including several reassigned from Iraq. Whether Flynn will get the rest of the intelligence assets he has requested will depend on Obama's decision.

Flynn grew up in Newport, R.I., the son of a retired Army master sergeant. During his freshman year of high school, he started dating his future wife, Lori. (He notes that they broke up in the 10th and 11th grades and she turned him down for the junior prom.)After attending the University of Rhode Island on an ROTC scholarship, Flynn became an intelligence officer with the 82nd Airborne Division in Ft. Bragg, N.C. He participated in the Grenada invasion in 1983 and peacekeeping operations in Haiti in 1994.

Flynn and McChrystal first worked together in the early part of the Afghanistan war. McChrystal was the chief of staff to the U.S. military command and Flynn was the intelligence director.

The two have forged an unusually close relationship, one in which Flynn feels comfortable giving his boss unvarnished advice.

"As a personal friend, he is always looking out for you," McChrystal said. "He is the guy who can say, 'You are too tired, you are talking stupid, go to sleep.' "

Flynn is adept at reading a gesture, or a half-formed expression, and instantly knowing what McChrystal wants to do. "We have a connection. I just have this sense of what he is thinking about," Flynn said.

His brother, Charlie, 46, met McChrystal first and is the commander's executive officer and top aide. The new command team in Afghanistan projects an air of austerity, illustrated by McChrystal's habit of eating only one meal a day. Even in that crowd, Michael Flynn's lifelong tightfisted ways stand out.

Charlie Flynn, a colonel, jokes about the way his brother happily mooches drinks at bars and the car he had driven daily to work at the Pentagon.

Michael Flynn, who would park his 1986 Buick Park Avenue next to the Suburbans, Cadillacs and Lexuses in the generals' lot, defended his car as a classic.

His brother was not impressed by the sagging springs of the car's velour seats. "He looked like a gangster pulling out of the Pentagon," Charlie Flynn said. "Gen. McChrystal says, 'The only guy cheaper than me is Mike Flynn.' "

The sixth of nine children, Michael Flynn said that growing up with so many brothers and sisters made him value privacy and quiet time. And the experience of being a middle child instilled in him an ability to command attention when he needs to and to think unconventionally.

"I've always operated so far outside my lane, I'm not sure what lane is mine anymore," Flynn said.

With his casual manner, Flynn projects a looseness uncharacteristic of Army intelligence officers. Intelligence experts, by and large, are trained to compartmentalize information, sharing it only with those who need to know. But in a series of top intelligence jobs, and now in Afghanistan, Flynn has worked to change the culture.

Robert Cardillo, a senior Defense Intelligence Agency official, said Flynn has long tried to get more people involved in sharing, analyzing and using intelligence.

Flynn's methods create tensions with people who want information held tightly.

"What is most useful about Mike's approach to problems was his unconventionality," Cardillo said. "He would ask things in ways that intelligence officers weren't raised to ask. What that would do is challenge the common wisdom."

To institutionalize the sharing of intelligence in Afghanistan, Flynn is building new intelligence "fusion cells." These centers are staffed and equipped to gather all available intelligence from video feeds, audio intercepts and other sources and make it available immediately to combat units across the country.

An even bigger hurdle for Flynn is improving how the allies share intelligence with the Afghan security forces. Earlier this year, Flynn proposed installing a secure video connection between the U.S. and Afghan military headquarters to allow officers to share intelligence and plan operations.

The project bumped up against North Atlantic Treaty Organization bureaucrats. In one meeting, Canadian and Polish officers, adeptly staying in their lanes, said Flynn's plan faced serious problems: No money was budgeted for the equipment, installing it would violate NATO rules and there were not enough technicians for the job.

As the meeting dragged on, Flynn became exasperated. "This isn't the Balkans and a peacekeeping mission," he told them. "This is a combat zone."

After the meeting, Flynn stopped the two officers in the gravel courtyard behind the NATO headquarters and tried to enlist them in his cause.

"We are going to move this command into the 21st century as fast as we can," Flynn told them. "If you want to push back, push back. If what I am saying isn't right, tell me. But from my experience, we can do this, and we can do it faster. Do not worry about perfect."

When they seemed to be coming around, he pressed his point. "We are beyond the nonsense," he said. "There is not a lot of time for us to show progress here in Afghanistan."

A few days later, Afghanistan's military command center got its top-secret communications equipment and a direct link to McChrystal's war room in Kabul, the capital.

On a summer evening in Kabul, darkness had fallen as Flynn scurried through a maze of buildings to his destination, a meeting being run by McChrystal.

Halfway there, Flynn stopped. "I get this feeling of anxiety," he said.

He fears that he will overlook an important issue or fail to prepare the commander for a crucial decision. "I can't miss anything," he said.

In front of the military headquarters, 42 flags representing the NATO countries and other nations contributing troops form a ring. It had been the deadliest fighting season for the alliance since the war began. On most other days, the 42 flags have been at half staff.

"The flags are at full mast," Flynn said that night as he looked up. "It is a good day."

Then he walked into the building and went back to work.

Tuesday, November 24, 2009

guardian: The mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui


The mystery of Dr Aafia Siddiqui

A Pakistani neuroscientist and mother of three is to stand trial in New York for attempted murder. But shadowy questions about her life remain – including her links to al-Qaida and her five 'lost' years

On a hot summer morning 18 months ago a team of four Americans – two FBI agents and two army officers – rolled into Ghazni, a dusty town 50 miles south of Kabul. They had come to interview two unusual prisoners: a woman in a burka and her 11-year-old son, arrested the day before.

Afghan police accused the mysterious pair of being suicide bombers. What interested the Americans, though, was what they were carrying: notes about a "mass casualty attack" in the US on targets including the Statue of Liberty and a collection of jars and bottles containing "chemical and gel substances".

At the town police station the Americans were directed into a room where, unknown to them, the woman was waiting behind a long yellow curtain. One soldier sat down, laying his M-4 rifle by his foot, next to the curtain. Moments later it twitched back.

The woman was standing there, pointing the officer's gun at his head. A translator lunged at her, but too late. She fired twice, shouting "Get the fuck out of here!" and "Allahu Akbar!" Nobody was hit. As the translator wrestled with the woman, the second soldier drew his pistol and fired, hitting her in the abdomen. She went down, still kicking and shouting that she wanted "to kill Americans". Then she passed out.

Whether this extraordinary scene is fiction or reality will soon be decided thousands of miles from Ghazni in a Manhattan courtroom. The woman is Dr Aafia Siddiqui, a Pakistani neuroscientist and mother of three. The description of the shooting, in July 2008, comes from the prosecution case, which Siddiqui disputes. What isn't in doubt is that there was an incident, and that she was shot, after which she was helicoptered to Bagram air field where medics cut her open from breastplate to bellybutton, searching for bullets. Medical records show she barely survived. Seventeen days later, still recovering, she was bundled on to an FBI jet and flown to New York where she now faces seven counts of assault and attempted murder. If convicted, the maximum sentence is life in prison.

The prosecution is but the latest twist in one of the most intriguing episodes of America's "war on terror". At its heart is the MIT-educated Siddiqui, once declared the world's most wanted woman. In 2003 she mysteriously vanished for five years, during which time she was variously dubbed the "Mata Hari of al-Qaida" or the "Grey Lady of Bagram", an iconic victim of American brutality.

Yet only the narrow circumstances of her capture – did she open fire on the US soldier? – are at issue in the New York court case. Fragile-looking, and often clad in a dark robe and white headscarf, Siddiqui initially pleaded not guilty, insisting she never touched the soldier's gun. Her lawyers say the prosecution's dramatic version of the shooting is untrue. Now, after months of pre-trial hearings, she appears bent on scuppering the entire process.

During a typically stormy hearing last Thursday, Siddiqui interrupted the judge, rebuked her own lawyers and made strident appeals to the packed courthouse. "I am boycotting this trial," she declared. "I am innocent of all the charges and I can prove it, but I will not do it in this court." Previously she had tried to fire her lawyers due to their Jewish background (she once wrote to the court that Jews are "cruel, ungrateful, back-stabbing" people) and demanded to speak with President Obama for the purpose of "making peace" with the Taliban. This time, though, she was ejected from the courtroom for obstruction. "Take me out. I'm not coming back," she said defiantly.

The trial, due to start in January, is just one piece of a much larger ­ puzzle. It is a tale of spies and militants, disappearance and deception, which has played out in the shadowlands of Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2001. In search of answers I criss-crossed Pakistan, tracking down Siddiqui's relatives, retired ministers, shadowy spy types and pamphleteers. The truth was maddeningly elusive. But it all started in Karachi, the sprawling port city on the Arabian Sea where Siddiqui was born 37 years ago.

Her parents were Pakistani strivers – middle-class folk with strong faith in Islam and education. Her father, Mohammad, was an English-trained doctor; her mother, Ismet, befriended the dictator General Zia ul-Haq. Aafia was a smart teenager, and in 1990 followed her older brother to the US. Impressive grades won her admission to the prestigious Massachusetts Institute of Technology and, later, Brandeis University, where she graduated in cognitive neuroscience. In 1995 she married a young Karachi doctor, Amjad Khan; a year later their first child, Ahmed, was born.

Siddiqui was also an impassioned Muslim activist. In Boston she campaigned for Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya; she was particularly affected by graphic videos of pregnant Bosnian women being killed. She wrote emails, held fundraisers and made forceful speeches at her local mosque. But the charities she worked with had sharp edges. The Nairobi branch of one, Mercy International Relief Agency, was linked to the 1998 US embassy bombings in east Africa; three other charities were later banned in the US for their links to al-Qaida.

The September 11 2001 attacks marked a turning point in Siddiqui's life. In May 2002 the FBI questioned her and her husband about some unusual internet purchases they had made: about $10,000 worth of night-vision goggles, body armour and 45 military-style books including The Anarchist's Arsenal. (Khan said he bought the equipment for hunting and camping expeditions.) Their marriage started to crumble. A few months later the couple returned to Pakistan and divorced that August, two weeks before the birth of their third child, Suleman.

On Christmas Day 2002 Siddiqui left her three children with her mother in Pakistan and returned to the US, ostensibly to apply for academic jobs. During the 10-day trip, however, Siddiqui did something controversial: she opened a post box in the name of Majid Khan, an alleged al-Qaida operative accused of plotting to blow up petrol stations in the Baltimore area. The post box, prosecutors later said, was to facilitate his entry into the US.

Six months after her divorce, she married Ammar al-Baluchi, a nephew of the 9/11 mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, at a small ceremony near Karachi. Siddiqui's family denies the wedding took place, but it has been confirmed by Pakistani and US intelligence, al-Baluchi's relatives and, according to FBI interview reports recently filed in court, Siddiqui herself. At any rate, it was a short-lived honeymoon.

In March 2003 the FBI issued a global alert for Siddiqui and her ex-husband, Amjad Khan. Then, a few weeks later, she vanished. According to her family, she climbed into a taxi with her three children – six-year-old Ahmed, four-year-old Mariam and six-month old Suleman – and headed for Karachi airport. They never made it. (Khan, on the other hand, was interviewed by the FBI in Pakistan, and subsequently released.)

Initially it was presumed that Siddiqui had been picked up by Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) spy agency at the behest of the CIA. The theory seemed to be confirmed by American media reports that Siddiqui's name had been given up by Mohammed, the 9/11 instigator, who was captured three weeks earlier. (If so, Mohammed was probably speaking under duress – the CIA waterboarded him 183 times that month.)

There are several accounts of what happened next. According to the US government, Siddiqui was at large, plotting mayhem on behalf of Osama bin Laden. In May 2004 the US attorney general, John Ashcroft, listed her among the seven "most wanted" al-Qaida fugitives. "Armed and dangerous," he said, describing the Karachi woman as a terrorist "facilitator" who was willing to use her education against America. "Al-Qaida Mom" ran the headline in the New York Post.

But Siddiqui's family and supporters tell a different story. Instead of plotting attacks, they say, Siddiqui spent the missing five years at the dreaded Bagram detention centre, north of Kabul, where she suffered unspeakable horrors. Yvonne Ridley, the British journalist turned Muslim campaigner, insists she is the "Grey Lady of Bagram" – a ghostly female detainee who kept prisoners awake "with her haunting sobs and piercing screams". In 2005 male prisoners were so agitated by her plight, she says, that they went on hunger strike for six days.

For campaigners such as Ridley, Siddiqui has become emblematic of dark American practices such as abduction, rendition and torture. "Aafia has iconic status in the Muslim world. People are angry with American imperialism and domination," she told me.

But every major security agency of the US government – army, FBI, CIA – denies having held her. Last year the US ambassador to Islamabad, Anne Patterson, went even further. She stated that Siddiqui was not in US custody "at any time" prior to July 2008. Her language was unusually categoric.

To reconcile these accounts I flew to Siddiqui's hometown of Karachi. The family lives in a spacious house with bougainvillea-draped walls in Gulshan Iqbal, a smart middle-class neighbourhood. Inside I took breakfast with her sister, Fowzia, on a patio overlooking a toy-strewn garden.

As servants brought piles of paratha (fried bread), Fowzia produced photos of a smiling young woman whom she described as the victim of an international conspiracy. The US had been abusing her sister in Bagram, she said, then produced her for trial as part of a gruesome justice pageant. "As far as I'm concerned this trial [in New York] is just a great drama. They write the script as they go. I've stopped asking questions," she said resignedly.

But Fowzia, a Harvard-educated neurologist, was frustratingly short on hard information. She responded to questions about Aafia's whereabouts between 2003 and 2008 with cryptic cliches. "It's not that we don't know. It's that we don't want to know," she said. And she blamed reports of al-Qaida links on a malevolent American press. "Half of them work for the CIA," she said.

The odd thing, though, was that the person who might unlock the entire mystery was living in the same house. After being captured with his mother in Ghazni last year, 11-year-old Ahmed Siddiqui was flown back to Pakistan on orders from the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai. Since then he has been living with his aunt Fowzia. Yet she has forbidden him from speaking with the press – even with Yvonne Ridley – because, she told me, he was too traumatised.

"You tell him to do something but he just stands there, staring at the TV," she said, sighing heavily. But surely, I insisted, after 15 months at home the boy must have divulged some clue about the missing years?

Fowzia's tone hardened. "Ahmed's not allowed to speak to the press. That was part of the deal when they gave him to us," she said firmly.

"Who are they?" I asked.

She waved a finger in the air. "The network. Those who brought him here."

Moments later Fowzia excused herself. The interview was over. As she walked me to the gate, I was struck by another omission: Fowzia had barely mentioned Ahmed's 11-year-old sister, Mariam, or his seven-year-old brother, Suleman, who are still missing. Amid the hullabaloo about their imprisoned mother, Aafia's children seemed to be strangely forgotten.

That night I went to see Siddiqui's ex-husband, Amjad Khan. He ushered me through a deathly quiet house into an upstairs room where we sat cross-legged on the floor. He had a soft face under the curly beard that is worn by devout Muslims. I recounted what Fowzia told me. He sighed and shook his head. "It's all a smokescreen," he said. "She's trying to divert your attention."

The truth of the matter, he said, was that Siddiqui had never been sent to Bagram. Instead she spent the five years on the run, living clandestinely with her three children, under the watchful eye of Pakistani intelligence. He told me they shifted between Quetta in Baluchistan province, Iran and the Karachi house I had visited earlier that day. It was a striking explanation. When I asked for proof, he started at the beginning.

Their parents, who arranged the marriage, thought them a perfect match. The couple had a lot in common – education, wealth and a love for conservative Islam. They were married over the phone; soon after Khan moved to America. But his new wife was a more fiery character than he wished. "She was so pumped up about jihad," he said.

Six months into the marriage, Siddiqui demanded the newlyweds move to Bosnia. Khan refused, and grew annoyed at her devotion to activist causes. During a furious argument one night, he told me, he flung a milk bottle at his wife that split her lip.

After 9/11 Aafia insisted on returning to Pakistan, telling her husband that the US government was forcibly converting Muslim children to Christianity. Later that winter she pressed him to go on "jihad" to Afghanistan, where she had arranged for them to work in a hospital in Zabul province. Khan refused, sparking a vicious row. "She went hysterical, beating her hands on my chest, asking for divorce," he recalled.

After Siddiqui disappeared in March 2003, Khan started to worry for his children – he had never seen his youngest son, Suleman. But he was reassured that they were still in Pakistan through three sources. He hired people to watch her house and they reported her comings and goings. His family was also briefed by ISI officials who said they were following her movements, he said. (Khan named an ISI brigadier whom I later contacted; he declined to speak).

Most strikingly, Khan claimed to have seen his ex-wife with his own eyes. In April 2003, he said, the ISI asked him to identify his ex-wife as she got off a flight from Islamabad, accompanied by her son. Two years later he spotted her again in a Karachi traffic jam. But he never went public with the information. "I wanted to protect her, for the sake of my children," he said.

Khan's version of events has enraged his ex-wife's family. Fowzia has launched a 500m rupees (£360,000) defamation law suit, while regularly attacking him in the press as a wifebeater set on "destroying" her family. "Marrying him was Aafia's biggest mistake," she told me. Khan says it is a ploy to silence him in the media and take away his children.

Khan's explanation is bolstered by the one person who claims to have met the missing neuroscientist between 2003 and 2008 – her uncle, Shams ul-Hassan Faruqi. Back in Islamabad, I went to see him.

A sprightly old geologist, Faruqi works from a cramped office filled with coloured rocks and dusty computers. Over tea and biscuits he described a strange encounter with his niece in January 2008, six months before she was captured in Afghanistan.

It started, he said, when a white car carrying a burka-clad woman pulled up outside his gate. Beckoning him to approach, he recognised her by her voice. "Uncle, I am Aafia," he recalled her saying. But she refused to leave the car and insisted they move to the nearby Taj Mahal restaurant to talk. Amid whispers, her story tumbled out.

Siddiqui told him she had been in both Pakistani and American captivity since 2003, but was vague on the details. "I was in the cells but I don't know in which country, or which city. They kept shifting me," she said. Now she had been set free but remained under the thumb of intelligence officials based in Lahore. They had given her a mission: to infiltrate al-Qaida in Pakistan. But, Siddiqui told her uncle, she was afraid and wanted out. She begged him to smuggle her into Afghanistan into the hands of the Taliban. "That was her main point," he recalled. "She said: 'I will be safe with the Taliban.'"

That night, Siddiqui slept at a nearby guesthouse, and stayed with her uncle the next day. But she refused to remove her burka. Faruqi said he caught a glimpse of her just once, while eating, and thought her nose had been altered. "I asked her, 'Who did plastic surgery on your face?' She said, 'nobody'."

On the third day, Siddiqui vanished again.

Amid the blizzard of allegations about Siddiqui, the most crucial voice is yet to be heard – her own. The trial, due to start in January, has suffered numerous delays. The longest was due to a six-month psychiatric evaluation triggered by defence claims that Siddiqui was "going crazy" – prone to crying fits and hallucinations involving flying infants, dark angels and a dog in her cell. "She's in total psychic pain," said her lawyer, Dawn Cardi, claiming that she was unfit to stand trial.

But at the Texas medical centre where the tests took place, Siddiqui refused to co-operate. "I can't hear you. I'm not listening," she told one doctor, sitting on the floor with her fingers in her ears. Others reported that she refused to speak with Jews, that she manipulated health workers and perceived herself to "be a martyr rather than a prisoner". Last July three of four experts determined she was malingering – faking a psychiatric illness to avoid an undesirable outcome. "She is an intelligent and at times manipulative woman who showed goal-directed and rational thinking," reported Dr Sally Johnson.

Judge Richard Berman ruled that Siddiqui "may have some mental health issues" but was competent to stand trial.

Back in Pakistan Siddiqui has become a cause celebre. Newspapers write unquestioningly about her "torture", parliament has passed resolutions, placard-waving demonstrators pound the streets and the government is spending $2m on a top-flight defence. High-profile supporters include the former cricketer Imran Khan and the Taliban leader Hakumullah Mehsud who has affectionately described Siddiqui as a "sister in Islam".

The unquestioning support is a product of public fury at US-orchestrated "disappearances", of which there have been hundreds in Pakistan, and deep scepticism about the American account of her capture. Few Pakistanis believe a frail 5ft 3in, 40kg woman could disarm an American soldier; fewer still think she would be carrying bomb booklets, chemicals and target lists.

But there are critics, too, albeit silent ones. A Musharraf-era minister with previous oversight of Siddiqui's case told me it was "full of bullshit and lies".

Two weeks ago the Obama administration introduced a fresh twist, when it announced that next year (or in 2011) five Guantanamo Bay detainees will be tried in the same New York courthouse, a few blocks from the World Trade Centre. One of them is Siddiqui's second husband, Ammar al-Baluchi, also known as Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, who stands accused of financing the 9/11 attacks.

But while the Guantanamo detainees will be tried for their part in mass terrorism, Siddiqui's case focuses on a minor controversy – whether she fired a gun at a soldier in an Afghan police station. And so the big questions may not be probed: whether the ISI or CIA abducted Siddiqui in 2003, what she did afterwards, and where her two missing children are now. In fact the framing of the charges raises a new question: if Siddiqui was such a dangerous terrorist five years ago, why is she not being charged as one now? A senior Pakistani official, speaking on condition of strict anonymity, offered a tantalising explanation.

In the world of counter-espionage, he said, someone like Siddiqui is an invaluable asset. And so, he speculated, sometime over the last five years she may have been "flipped" – turned against militant sympathisers – by Pakistani or American intelligence. "It's a very murky world," he said.

"Maybe the Americans have no charges against her. Maybe they don't want to compromise their sources of information. Or maybe they don't want to put that person out in the world again. The thing is, you'll never really know."

Monday, November 23, 2009

Time: Iran's Green Movement Reaches Out to U.S.


Iran's Green Movement Reaches Out to U.S.

After more than five months of going it alone, Iran's opposition Green Movement is reaching out to the United States for help. Via public and private channels, the Obama Administration has received several appeals in recent weeks to take a stronger stand against human-rights abuses in Iran, avoid military action and impose more aggressive and rapid-fire sanctions against the Revolutionary Guards and its vast business interests.

The opposition's outreach comes as the Administration weighs the next move in its diplomatic effort to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran. Tehran has effectively rebuffed a confidence-building deal that would ship out the bulk of Iran's enriched-uranium stockpile to be converted into fuel rods for a medical-research reactor — which would also have added about a year to the time frame within which Iran could weaponize nuclear material. The deal would have offered more time for longer-term diplomatic negotiations. As a result, President Obama has begun trying to rally international support for a new round of sanctions. (See pictures of people around the world protesting Iran's election.)

Washington has struggled since the disputed June 12 presidential election to figure out how to engage the regime without undermining the opposition. Now it has begun to hear answers from the Green Movement itself.

The most public message has come from Mohsen Makhmalbaf, the exiled revolutionary filmmaker turned dissident who claims to speak on behalf of the Green Movement, during a Washington visit last week. He told U.S. officials and Iran experts Thursday that the military action would only strengthen the hard-line regime of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatullah Ali Khamenei. "Dialogue is definitely better than war," said Makhmalbaf. (See the top 10 players in Iran's power struggle.)

At the same time, Makhmalbaf warned that the West should not "trample" on the Green Movement by fully embracing Iran's regime if it eventually reverses course on nuclear talks. He and other prominent opposition members are also urging the White House to more actively condemn the brutal crackdown since the election that gave Ahmadinejad a second term despite opposition claims of widespread fraud. The limited reaction has allowed the regime to believe the outside world is indifferent to what is happening inside Iran, he said.

Makhmalbaf said even modest steps are important, such as publicly mentioning opposition victims like Neda Agha-Soltan, the student shot dead during the June uprising who became an opposition symbol. (Obama mentioned her death, but not by name, the day he won the Nobel Peace Prize.) Washington also needs to recognize and respond to opposition statements, like the apology from Iran's leading dissident cleric, Ayatullah Ali Montazeri, for the 1979 U.S. embassy takeover. Montazeri was once heir-apparent to the revolution's founder, Ayatullah Ruhollah Khomeini, and his gesture on the 30th anniversary of the seizure was a risky step that passed largely ignored by Washington.

As the Administration begins lobbying its international partners for punitive new measures against Iran, Makhmalbaf and other opposition figures have urged the U.S. to focus primarily on the Revolutionary Guards. The élite unit is a growing political and economic behemoth, and its leadership is critical in propping up the troubled regime. They are not supporting other measures under consideration, like curbs on gasoline imports Iran relies on for domestic consumption, because these would mainly hurt the Iranian public, opposition figures have told U.S. officials.

"We need certain sanctions to hurt the regime, but not the people," said Makhmalbaf, who urged Washington to quickly impose a series of sanctions on the Guards since incremental steps allow them time to develop alternatives. The award-winning filmmaker, who now lives in Europe, said he was sent to Washington by the opposition; his talk at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was attended by senior officials from the National Security Council and the State Department.

Iran's refusal to accept the deal that required shipping out nuclear material for reprocessing in Russia and France, say Iranian analysts, is partly linked to the divide between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei. The President, they say, is more interested than the Supreme Leader is in improving relations with Washington, a major coup that could earn Ahmadinejad badly needed international legitimacy. But he refuses to compromise on Iran's right to enrich uranium, a position with strong support from across the Iranian political spectrum.

Khamenei, meanwhile, is said to reject improving relations with the United States as anathema to essence of the Islamic Revolution. At the same time, analysts say he was initially more open to a compromise on a short-term deal.

Ironically, however, one reason among others for Iran's reversal after initially approving the deal was that Green Movement leaders had criticized it. Mir-Hossein Mousavi, the opposition candidate who claims to have won the disputed election, criticized the proposal negotiated by Ahmadinejad's team at Vienna, warning that if implemented, it would negate the work of thousands of Iranian scientists. Opposition figures and analysts say his response was merely an attempt to play spoiler and prevent the regime from benefiting politically from a deal with the West. Still, nuclear diplomacy with the West has effectively become a political football in Tehran, complicating President Obama's quest for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear standoff.

telegraph: Fifteen per cent of Afghan army 'are drug addicts'

Fifteen per cent of Afghan army 'are drug addicts'

Afghan governmental plans to increase army and police numbers have been greeted with scepticism by diplomats and military experts who say the figures are too ambitious.

...

But Nato commanders, who approved a plan to accelerate the training programme last month, said that the Afghan army is plagued by defections and drug addiction.

Of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers trained so far, 10,000 have gone missing, said General Egon Ramms, the German commander of the operational headquarters in charge of the Nato-led International Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).

Around 15 per cent are drug addicts, he said.

The police, one member of which shot dead five British soldiers earlier this month, faced similar problems, are prone to corruption and their training has been inefficient, he said.

McChrystal plans to double the size of the Afghan police within a few years. Their losses are expected to reach 1,500 killed this year, and around 10,000 are Awol.

The US president, Barack Obama, is considering a large increase in US troop numbers, which is expected to be announced after Thanksgiving, which is on Thursday, and to include some trainers.


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Afghanistan lacks the capacity to recruit and train men in large enough numbers, they said, despite a pledge by President Hamid Karzai to take over the nation's security from foreign troops by the end of his newly begun five-year term.

Abdul Rahim Wardak, the Afghan defence minister, used a ceremony on Saturday in Kabul, at which Nato took command of Afghan army training, to announce that security force numbers would be cranked up to 400,000.

"Our programme is to have a total of 240,000 soldiers," ministry spokesman Zahir Azimi said, more than double the current about 100,000.

They hope to have 150,000 by the end of next year, he added, with the rest "in following years".

Police numbers would rise to 160,000 from the current 97,000, said Zamarai Bashary, an interior ministry spokesman, adding that the "deadline is under discussion".

Experts said recruiting such numbers would be difficult because Afghanistan lacks a pool of literate young men, as well as veterans with leadership skills, facilities for training and grooming, and money for weapons and ammunition.

"That means they will have to be raising trained soldiers at a rate of 3,000 people per month - that's a very tall order," said a military attache in Kabul, speaking on condition of anonymity.

"They will have to find more than 100,000 at least semi-educated young men who are volunteers to join the army. It will be difficult," he said.

Afghanistan's first batch of 120 officers passed out earlier this year after four years' training at the National Military Academy.

Increasing police numbers faced similar problems to the army, said a Western diplomat, speaking anonymously.

Wardak had spoken "prematurely", he said, as interior ministry working groups have yet to complete the reports on which any such decisions would be based.

"There is no way we can recruit that many people," the diplomat said.

"The numbers are political. The Afghans are under pressure from the United States to boost the numbers, but the Afghans are also putting on the pressure for support to do so."

Western nations supporting Afghanistan are pressuring Karzai to bolster security forces and take responsibility for the war against Taliban-led insurgents so their own forces can be drawn down.

Afghan defence forces are currently backed by more than 100,000 international soldiers taking the operational lead in battling the insurgents, who are spreading their footprint across the war-ravaged country.

The US and Nato are eager to cut deployments in response to public opinion, which is increasingly impatient with a perceived lack of progress in the war.

Karzai, bowing to international pressure, vowed in a speech marking his inauguration last week that Afghan forces will lead operations in three years and take overall responsibility in five years.

"We are determined that within the next five years, the Afghan forces are capable of taking the lead in ensuring security and stability across the country," he said.

General Stanley McChrystal, the US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, has adopted a strategy called "partnering" in which Afghan and foreign soldiers train, live and fight together.

But Nato commanders, who approved a plan to accelerate the training programme last month, said that the Afghan army is plagued by defections and drug addiction.

Of the 94,000 Afghan soldiers trained so far, 10,000 have gone missing, said General Egon Ramms, the German commander of the operational headquarters in charge of the Nato-led International Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF).

Around 15 per cent are drug addicts, he said.

The police, one member of which shot dead five British soldiers earlier this month, faced similar problems, are prone to corruption and their training has been inefficient, he said.

McChrystal plans to double the size of the Afghan police within a few years. Their losses are expected to reach 1,500 killed this year, and around 10,000 are Awol.

The US president, Barack Obama, is considering a large increase in US troop numbers, which is expected to be announced after Thanksgiving, which is on Thursday, and to include some trainers.


telegraph: Karzai under pressure after investigations target 15 officials on corruption charges (afghanistan)

Karzai under pressure after investigations target 15 officials on corruption charges

Hamid Karzai, Afghanistan's president, has bowed to international anger over official corruption by sanctioning investigations into 15 senior appointees in his governments including two serving cabinet ministers.


The attorney general's office revealed that at least two serving ministers had been summoned for questioning on suspicion of embezzlement. Assistance from Interpol has been requested after an arrest warrant was issued for one former government member who is believed to have disappeared.

Several prosecutions are pending a request for Mr Karzai to sign other arrest warrants and legal officials have complained that the Afghan leader has put off a decision."We are investigating 15 ministers, which includes former ministers," said Fazel Ahmad Faqiryar, deputy attorney general. "They are being investigated for corruption. Some are in Afghanistan and some are outside. Most are living abroad. Interpol and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are helping us find them."

Washington and London have threatened Mr Karzai that the military support he relies on, as well as continued aid payments, depends on his efforts to stuanch official graft.

Billions of dollars of aid have had little visible effect in Afghanistan and the rampant theft of official funds has alienated many poor Afghans from the Kabul government. Mr Karzai last week acknowledged corruption is a "stain" on Afghanistan but has attempted to shift the blame to international donors.

The disclosure comes days after an American newspaper reported claims that Muhammad Ibrahim Adel, minister for mines, had accepted a $30m (£18m) bribe from a Chinese company while other reports said the ministry for hajj and Islamic affairs was also under scrutiny.

Mr Faqiryar would not confirm names of the ministers under under investigation. Mr Adel and others identified in the media have denied allegations of corruption.

Two officials from the Islamic Ministry are in custody after they were found carrying about $400,000 en route from Saudi Arabia where they were dispatched to lease accommodation for Afghan pilgrims.

The highest level confirmation of the investigations came from the country's attorney general who publicly called on Mr Karzai to sanction more prosecutions. "We have indictments with sufficient proof against five ministers," said General Mohammed Ishaq Aloko. "Two of them are in the current cabinet and three are former ministers. The President only has to grant his approval, then the trials can proceed."

An arrest warrant has been issued for Nadir Atash, the former head of the national airline Ariana, who isposted as wanted on the Interpol website and believed to have fled to the United States. A police source said the lack of extradition treaties with Afghanistan was hindering the search."These guys have gone abroad and are almost claiming immunity," he said. "There's not much that can be done unless they come back."

Afghanistan last week announced it would set up a new major crimes unit to scrutinise the affairs of officials.

One international official questioned whether those under investigation were "sacrificial lambs" offered to the international community.

He said: "These guys political careers are already over. We need to see if he will prosecute those close to him."

A spokesman for the United Nations said: "Recent action that we have seen is encouraging and must be continued robustly if the authorities are to build confidence," "The Afghan people and the international community expect the authorities to root out corruption wherever it is identified."