Saturday, July 30, 2011

nytimes:U.S. Report Finds Security Deteriorating in Iraq

U.S. Report Finds Security Deteriorating in Iraq

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/world/middleeast/31iraq.html

BAGHDAD — Over the past year, security in Iraq has deteriorated and electricity shortages and corruption have continued unabated, according to a report released Saturday by a special inspector appointed by Congress to oversee Iraq’s reconstruction.

The report, released five months before the United States is scheduled to withdraw 47,000 troops from Iraq, paints a bleaker picture of the country’s stability than assessments by diplomatic officials.

“Iraq remains an extraordinarily dangerous place to work,” said Stuart W. Bowen Jr., who has run the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction since its creation in 2004.

“Buttressing this conclusion is the fact that June was the deadliest month for U.S. troops in more than two years,” he added. “Shia militias — possibly armed and trained by Iran — were responsible for some of the lethal attacks.”

In particular, Mr. Bowen said that Diyala Province, a region east of Baghdad that is one of the most violent battlegrounds for sectarian violence, remained unstable. He added that local officials were extremely pessimistic about security and the economy.

“In July meetings about the security situation the province’s chief prosecutor remarked that every time he steps outside his house, it ‘is a walk into the unknown,’ ” the report said.

There have been several significant attacks in Diyala in recent months. And on Saturday, at least nine civilians were wounded in two separate attacks in the province, local security officials said.

The report said that Iraqis had significantly increased their use of electricity over the past two years but that the supply had remained the same and significant power shortages continued. Investigators looking into corruption by the Iraqi government “remain stymied by political resistance and lack of capacity and have difficulty pursuing cases involving complex crimes and high-level officials,” the report said.

It also offered a cautious view of State Department plans for Iraq’s development, mentioning that the training of the Iraqi police force “will be challenging,” in part because it will include only 200 advisers based at three sites across the country’s 10 provinces.

Reiterating statements Mr. Bowen made earlier this year, the report said that State Department officials had thwarted his office’s attempts to audit the program. A State Department spokesman in Washington declined comment; department officials have contended that Mr. Bowen’s office does not have jurisdiction over their operations after Oct. 1.

Some Iraqi officials in Baghdad objected to the report’s assessment of their country’s security situation. “The report is exaggerated,” said Hussain al-Asadi, a member of Parliament from Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc. “There are failures and shortcomings in the government and the security forces, but it is not as bad as the report says it is.”

He added, “Such reports have meaning inside America, but in Iraq it has no impact.”

Also on Saturday, Mr. Maliki gave a speech before Parliament about shrinking the Iraqi government. Mr. Maliki had been under pressure to reduce the budget in response to protests in February calling for a more accountable government. After the speech, Parliament voted to eliminate 14 departments, including the ministers of state for marshes, tribal affairs and Parliament affairs.

WHITEHOUSE.GOV:SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS(SAP);DHS,ATTORNEY GENERAL



WHITEHOUSE.GOV:SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS(SAP);DHS,ATTORNEY GENERAL

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information

Sec. 4.3. Special Access Programs. (a) Establishment of special access programs. Unless otherwise authorized by the President, only the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each, may create a special access program. For special access programs pertaining to intelligence sources, methods, and activities (but not including military operational, strategic, and tactical programs), this function shall be exercised by the Director of National Intelligence. These officials shall keep the number of these programs at an absolute minimum, and shall establish them only when the program is required by statute or upon a specific finding that:

(1) the vulnerability of, or threat to, specific information is exceptional; and

(2) the normal criteria for determining eligibility for access applicable to information classified at the same level are not deemed sufficient to protect the information from unauthorized disclosure.

(b) Requirements and limitations. (1) Special access programs shall be limited to programs in which the number of persons who ordinarily will have access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing enhanced protection for the information involved.

(2) Each agency head shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs consistent with directives issued pursuant to this order.

(3) Special access programs shall be subject to the oversight program established under section 5.4(d) of this order. In addition, the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office shall be afforded access to these programs, in accordance with the security requirements of each program, in order to perform the functions assigned to the Information Security Oversight Office under this order. An agency head may limit access to a special access program to the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office and no more than one other employee of the Information Security Oversight Office or, for special access programs that are extraordinarily sensitive and vulnerable, to the Director only.

(4) The agency head or principal deputy shall review annually each special access program to determine whether it continues to meet the requirements of this order.

(5) Upon request, an agency head shall brief the National Security Advisor, or a designee, on any or all of the agency's special access programs.

(6) For the purposes of this section, the term "agency head" refers only to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the Director of National Intelligence, or the principal deputy of each.

(c) Nothing in this order shall supersede any requirement made by or under 10 U.S.C. 119.

ACLU MIKE GERMAN SECRET LAW ETC. REPORT

ACLU MIKE GERMAN SECRET LAW ETC. REPORT

https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/secrecyreport_20110727.pdf

The Obama DOJ charged State Department contractor Stephen Kim with leaking rather innocuous information about North Korea’s expected reaction to new economic sanctions to Fox News.54

54 Steven Aftergood, Another Leak Prosecution, Secrcrecy News, Aug. 30, 2010, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2010/08/another_leak.html (last visited June 27, 2011).

Secret Laws
In 2008 the Constitution Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing to examine what its then-Chairman, Senator Russ Feingold, called the “increasing prevalence in our country of secret law.”58 Examples of this “particularly sinister trend” included secret opinions of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinions, and President Bush’s claimed authority to ignore or violate Executive Orders without amending them.
In his first months in office, President Obama agreed to release OLC memos and other documents relating to the Bush administration’s torture program that the ACLU and other public interest organizations had long sought under the Freedom of Information Act. The decision to release these documents has historic importance, and allows Americans to evaluate the legal justifications for the torture program and decide for themselves whether the architects of this program acted legally and in good faith.
Unfortunately, his administration has not been as forthcoming on other issues. The public debate over the Patriot Act reauthorization, for example, has been hampered by excessive secrecy surrounding the manner in which the executive branch interprets and implements its provisions, particularly Section 215, the so-called “library records” provision, which amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to allow the government to obtain secret FISC orders to seize “any tangible thing” the government claims is relevant to a terrorism or espionage investigation. Congress has repeatedly requested that DOJ declassify “key information” pertaining to the government’s use of Section 215 so that the public can understand the “true scope” of the Patriot Act, to no avail.59 During the 2011 Patriot Act reauthorization debate, Senators Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mark Udall (D-CO), who each sit on the Senate Intelligence Committee and have access to classified information regarding how the government interprets the law, introduced an amendment that would have required the Justice Department to reveal its secret interpretation of its intelligence collection authorities under FISA.60 Senator Wyden gave his colleagues an ominous warning: “When the American people find out how their government has secretly interpreted the Patriot Act, they will be stunned and they will be angry.”61 The amendment failed, and the Patriot Act provisions were extended until 2015.


58 Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 110th Cong., (Apr. 30, 2008) (statement of Russ Feingold, Chairman of the S. Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da139cdb5&wit_id=e655f9e2809e5476862f735da139cdb5-0-0.

Elsewhere in the Obama Executive Order, new provisions that could be extremely helpful were somewhat diluted by other measures. For example:
• A positive provision ended the power of the CIA to veto declassification decisions by the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), the body that adjudicates challenges to agency classification decisions. However, this provision is weakened by new provisions that give the CIA and the Director of National Intelligence voting seats on ISCAP (where only four votes are necessary to decide a declassification issue), and allow the CIA to appeal the Panel’s decisions to the National Security Advisor.69

Even more troubling, the EO authorizes the Attorney General and Secretary of Homeland Security to establish highly classified Special Access Programs.72 This provision is particularly threatening to the civil liberties of U.S. persons, given that these agencies primarily focus on domestic rather than foreign threats and are therefore more likely to include programs targeting citizens and residents of the United States for investigation and prosecution.

releas69
Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, Sec. 5.3 (Dec. 29, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/executive-order-classified-national-security-information.
70 Id., at sections 1.5(d) and 3.3.
71 Id.
72 Id., at section 4.3.


...Secret techniques are less necessary and less effective. Ultimately the purpose of our intelligence agencies is to provide policymakers with the information they need to make good decisions. When President Truman created the CIA, all he really wanted was an international news “clipping service” that would tell him what he needed to know about the events of the day.154 Today, no secret intelligence techniques or covert actions are required to obtain detailed information from multiple sources around the world. Anyone with access to the Internet, e-mail, blogs and Twitter can now closely follow unfolding political and social events happening around the world—such as political protests in Tehran,155 demonstrations in the former Soviet republic of Moldova,156 or the Chinese government’s latest attempts to censor critics.157 Yet, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) alleged the CIA ignored open-source information in failing to properly warn policy-makers about the seriousness of the uprising in Egypt, which had been organized primarily on public websites: “I would call it a big intelligence wake-up … Open source material has to become much more significant in the analysis of intelligence…”158

...Secret techniques are harder to keep secret. Because of advances in technology, covert operations have become much harder to keep covert, reducing their effectiveness. Hobbyist “plane spotters” exposed extraordinary rendition flights by tracing the routes of CIA-chartered planes on the Internet.159 Italian prosecutors used cell phone and credit card records to identify CIA operatives involved in the kidnapping of a Muslim cleric.160 News and photographs of civilian casualties from U.S. operations in remote areas have quickly flashed around the world—and are often used as propaganda to fuel anti-American sentiment. In a time where the transfer of information is instant and irreversible, a secrecy regime based on a Cold War model for document security provides only a false sense of security that burdens our national security workforce with high costs and inefficiencies, yet too often fails to protect legitimate secrets from our enemies.161

...Secrets hold their value for a shorter time. When information about our world and what is going on within it is much more widely available, the temporary advantage that sometimes accrues to exclusive possession of information—whether technical data, economic forecasts, or political situations—inevitably shrinks. A 1970 Defense Department study found that classified scientific and technological information could only be expected to be kept secret for a few years—with one year being the most “reasonable” assumption.162 The report concluded that “more might be gained than lost if our nation were to adopt... a policy of complete openness in all areas of information.” Technology advancements since 1970 only make these conclusions more valid and the advantages provided by secrecy more fleeting than ever.

...Failing to share information within Congress. The executive does not have the authority to tell members of the Intelligence Committees or the Gang of Eight they cannot share what they learn in these briefings with other members of Congress.187 Gang of Eight members retain the authority to determine when and how to inform the other intelligence committee members what they learned in the secret briefings, and only the House and Senate’s own internal rules dictate how non-Intelligence Committee members can receive classified information from the Intelligence Committees. Yet uncertainty regarding when, how and with whom highly classified information may be shared often puts members in a legally and politically precarious position. When members of the Intelligence Committees and the Gang of Eight fail to exercise their authority to share information with other members of Congress (and ultimately with the public they serve), they cede power to the executive and abandon their responsibilities to check executive branch activities and defend the functioning of representative democracy.

WashPost:Administration rebuffs Wyden, Udall on surveillance query

Administration rebuffs Wyden, Udall on surveillance query

http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/national-security/administration-rebuffs-wyden-udall-on-surveillance-query/2011/07/26/gIQAaZ5udI_story.html

The Obama administration continued Wednesday to resist the efforts of two Democratic senators to learn more about the government’s interpretation of domestic surveillance law, stating that “it is not reasonably possible” to identify the number of Americans whose communications may have been monitored under the statute.

In a letter to Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Mark Udall (D-Colo.), Kathleen Turner, director of legislative affairs for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, also said that a joint oversight team “has not found indications of any intentional or willful attempts to violate or circumvent” the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act or FISA, which was amended in 2008.

“Every time the American public finds out that laws have been rewritten in secret or the administration can’t give a basic answer, it erodes public confidence and makes it harder for intelligence agencies to do their jobs,” said Wyden, who for the past two years has decried what he calls a de facto “secret law” governing domestic surveillance. He and Udall say they will again offer an amendment to the current intelligence authorization bill to compel the administration to reveal the legal basis for certain intelligence-gathering activities.

Wyden’s concern and the broader issue of excessive government secrecy in the pursuit of national security form the basis of a report to be issued Thursday by the American Civil Liberties Union.

“We are now living in an age of government secrecy run amok,” said the report, written by Mike German, a former FBI undercover agent, and Jay Stanley.

The report notes that during the debate in the spring to reauthorize the Patriot Act, which also amended FISA, Wyden and Udall pressed the administration to disclose the legal rationale for some surveillance measures.

The ACLU report also said that the government is unnecessarily classifying vast amounts of information, undermining efforts to hold officials accountable and facilitate an informed public debate.

The government made a record 76.8 million classification decisions in 2010, according to official statistics cited in the report. The 40 percent rise over the year before is due to the explosion in the use of electronic communications and new requirements to count and report every e-mail, blog entry or other such missives that include classified information, officials said. Problems with classification are common, said Steven Aftergood, director of the Federation of American Scientists’ Project on Government Secrecy. He noted that the National Security Agency, the nation’s largest spy agency, only last November declassified a 200-year-old document on cryptography that had been published and posted online for years. Although the NSA last month hailed the disclosure as evidence of its commitment to meet the requirements of President Obama’s policy on transparency, it turned out that the text, captured by U.S. troops after World War II and placed in intelligence files, was never classified in the first place, Aftergood wrote in a blog posting Wednesday.

The document was available in German libraries, and the full 532-page text of the 1809 study was digitized several years ago and published online through Google Books, Aftergood said.

He called the NSA’s move “a disturbing sign of futility and irrelevance in the nation’s declassification program.”

William A. Cira, acting director of the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office, established in 1978 to oversee government classification activities, acknowledged that there are “always going to be some examples of some things that didn’t need to be classified.” But, he said, “what gets classified by and large needs to be classified.”

The ACLU urged Congress to take the lead in challenging practices allowing excessive secrecy. The group recommended expanding the number of lawmakers who should be notified of secret intelligence activities and limiting the types of information that the government may classify. At a hearing Tuesday, a senior NSA official acknowledged to Wyden that the special FISA court, which conducts proceedings in secret, has issued opinions pertaining to key portions of the amended surveillance law but that they could not be discussed in an unclassified setting. In her letter to Wyden and Udall, Turner said the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Justice Department are reviewing the opinions to see whether portions can be declassified and released to the public.

In unrelated court proceedings, the government has sometimes tried to make substitutions for classified information, as happened recently in a failed bid to win a felony conviction for a former NSA official suspected of mishandling classified information.

When the trial judge demurred, the prosecution withheld certain evidence rather than put forward what it deemed to be sensitive data. Among the terms the government sought to keep secret was a phrase describing a certain technology. According to a person familiar with the case, the term was “fiber optic.”

CATO:Wyden Pressing Intel Officials on Domestic Location Tracking

Wyden Pressing Intel Officials on Domestic Location Tracking

http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/wyden-pressing-intel-officials-on-domestic-location-tracking/

Back in May, during the debates over reauthorization of the Patriot Act, Sens. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and Mark Udall (D-CO) began raising a fuss about a secret interpretation of the law’s so-called “business records” authority, known to wonks as Section 215, arguing that intelligence agencies had twisted the statute to give themselves domestic surveillance powers Congress had not anticipated or intended. At the time, I marshaled a fair amount of circumstantial evidence that, I thought, suggested that the “secret authority” involved location tracking of cell phones. Wyden backed off after being promised a secret hearing to address his concerns—but indicated he’d be returning to the issue if he remained unsatisfied. The hearing occurred early last month. Now I suspect we’re seeing the other shoe dropping.

At a confirmation hearing this morning for Matthew Olsen, who’s been tapped to head the National Counterterrorism Center, Wyden repeatedly asked the nominee whether the intelligence community “use[s] cell site data to track the location of Americans inside the country.” This comes on the heels of a letter Wyden and Udall sent to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper demanding an answer to the same question. Olsen was unsurprisingly vague, calling it a “complicated question” but allowing that there were “certain circumstances where that authority may exist.” The committee was promised a memo explaining those “circumstances” by September. That means that just about ten years after Congress approved the Patriot Act, a handful of legislators may get the privilege of learning what it does. Ah, democracy.

On a related note, one of the data points I cited in my previous post was that Wyden’s Geolocation Privacy and Surveillance Act had, somewhat unusually, been structured primarily as a reform to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which governs intelligence spying, only later incorporating the same protections into the statutes governing ordinary criminal investigations. Especially striking was the inclusion of a specific prohibition on the use of Section 215 for location tracking, above and beyond the general warrant requirement. Since that writing, however, the bill gained Republican co-sponsorship, and dropped the changes to FISA that had previously been the bill’s centerpiece. Instead, the bill now contains an explicit exception for FISA “electronic surveillance,” in addition to the section providing for location tracking authorized by either a criminal or a FISA warrant. I’m not privy to whatever negotiations necessitated that change, but it’s hard to imagine anyone would have insisted on such a substantial restructuring if the intelligence community weren’t doing at least some location tracking pursuant to a lower standard than probable cause.

It’s not entirely clear exactly what the current version of the bill would permit, however. FISA is mentioned twice in the draft: once as part of a vague general exemption for “electronic surveillance,” and then again as one of the sources of authority for a “warrant” to do geolocation tracking. At a first pass, though, those two definitions ought to overlap, because FISA requires a secret intelligence court to issue a warrant based on probable cause (to believe the target is an “agent of a foreign power”) for government monitoring that falls within the FISA’s definition of “electronic surveillance,” in contrast with the far laxer standards that apply to the use of Section 215. It’s therefore an interesting puzzle what, exactly, that exception is meant to permit. Possibly the idea is to permit the (otherwise prohibited) “use” and “disclosure” of geolocation information already obtained without a warrant in order to target future judicially authorized “electronic surveillance,” but it’s hard to be sure. What does seem increasingly sure, however, is that location tracking is connected to the controversy over Section 215—and that Congress owes the American people a debate over the proper use and scope of that power, which it has thus far refused to have.

Julian SanchezJuly 26, 2011 @ 5:36 pm

techdirt:Wyden Continues To Press Intelligence Officials About Tracking Americans Under 'Secret' Interpretation Of The Patriot Act from the you-have-n

Wyden Continues To Press Intelligence Officials About Tracking Americans Under 'Secret' Interpretation Of The Patriot Act

from the you-have-no-privacy dept

http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110727/04125215277/wyden-continues-to-press-intelligence-officials-about-tracking-americans-under-secret-interpretation-patriot-act.shtml

Senator Ron Wyden has made it pretty clear, for the past few months, that the federal government is secretly interpreting the PATRIOT Act to mean that it can spy on the location of Americans without a warrant. Wyden, who is likely aware of the interpretation due to his position on the Senate Intelligence Committee, can't say what the interpretation is, but it's become abundantly clear through his questioning. Recently, we noted his questions to Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, specifically asking if government agencies "have the authority to collect the geolocation information."

And now he's been asking the same basic question, getting even more specific, and confirming what some had suspected all along. The link there is from Julian Sanchez, who was one of the first to piece together the clues and suggest that Wyden was hinting at an interpretation of the PATRIOT Act that let the government feel it could track location info on just about anyone with a mobile phone. Whereas Wyden's previous questions focused generally on collecting location info, in this hearing, Wyden specifically asked if the intelligence community uses "cell site data to track the location of Americans inside the country." At this point, it's kind of ridiculous that the feds don't just come out and admit it. At the hearing Wyden was told that there were "certain circumstances" under which such authority could exist, but that it was "complicated." However, he was promised more details on the circumstances by September. As Sanchez notes:

That means that just about ten years after Congress approved the Patriot Act, a handful of legislators may get the privilege of learning what it does. Ah, democracy.
There really are two separate issues here, each of which is disturbing. The first, of course, is the feds possibly believing that they can effectively spy on everyone's location at will. If true, that seems like a gross expansion of the surveillance state. But, perhaps an even bigger issue is that the federal government feels that it can secretly interpret laws with meanings that certainly are not stated explicitly within the law... and can then avoid explaining what its own interpretation is. That's not how a representative and transparent government is supposed to work.

fbi.gov:WMD Central Part 2: Looking Back, Looking Ahead

WMD Central
Part 2: Looking Back, Looking Ahead

http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/july/wmd_072911/wmd_072911

Our interview continues with Dr. Vahid Majidi, head of our Weapons of Mass Destruction, or WMD, Directorate, which marked its fifth anniversary on July 26.

Q. Can you provide a few examples of successful WMD investigations over the past five years?

Dr. Majidi: We’ve managed quite a few cases actually, including our first major counterproliferation investigation that involved two Iranian men and one Iranian-American who were charged in California with conspiring to export certain technologies from the U.S. to Iran. Other examples include a Texas man charged with possessing 62 pounds of sodium cyanide; a government contractor in Tennessee charged with trying to sell restricted U.S. Department of Energy materials; and a Nevada man charged with possessing deadly ricin. (Note: see the sidebar for more examples.)

Q. What has the FBI learned over the past five years?

Dr. Majidi: Quite a bit. For some time, we’ve had WMD coordinators in every one of our field offices. But we realize that for WMD prevention to be truly comprehensive, we need to think and act globally. So that’s why—in addition to our network of legal attaché offices and agents around the world—we’ve recently put our first WMD coordinators overseas, in our offices in Tbilsi and Singapore. We also have personnel assigned to Interpol to help it develop an international WMD training program like ours.

Q. What kind of work is done overseas?

Dr. Majidi: It runs the gamut. For instance, several years ago, after an interdiction of highly enriched uranium in Georgia in the former Soviet Union, our WMD experts performed a forensic analysis of the material and then testified in Georgian courts. And when the Russian defector in London was poisoned with a radioactive isotope in 2006, our WMD personnel shadowed London Metropolitan Police during the ensuing investigation to develop lessons learned to help us prepare for such a scenario here. Through it all, we’ve built some strong relationships with our global partners.

Q. What are the WMD Directorate’s plans for the next five years?

Dr. Majidi: The basic knowledge and material that go into making weapons of mass destruction is becoming more readily available to anyone, anywhere in the world as the Information Age matures. That’s why we’ll continue to be all about partnerships—locally, nationally, and internationally. We’ll also focus even more on threats on the horizon. For example, we’ll look at emerging developments like synthetic biology from a preventative point of view. By collaborating with the synthetic biology community, we can articulate our safety and security concerns as they relate to weapons of mass destruction. We’ll also be improving our threat analysis capabilities to better spot potential WMD opportunities, potential WMD vulnerabilities, and gaps in our intelligence collection.

Q. What can the average citizen do to assist law enforcement with the WMD threat?

Dr. Majidi: Keep in mind that to develop weapons of mass destruction, you only need two things: the material and the know-how. So please, if you see anything suspicious or in a place where it doesn’t belong, report it to local law enforcement or your closest FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force. It could be just the tip we need to stop something serious.

WSJ:Depression in Command In times of crisis, mentally ill leaders can see what others don't

Depression in Command

In times of crisis, mentally ill leaders can see what others don't

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111904800304576474451102761640.html?mod=WSJ_World_MIDDLENews

When times are good and the ship of state only needs to sail straight, mentally healthy people function well as political leaders. But in times of crisis and tumult, those who are mentally abnormal, even ill, become the greatest leaders. We might call this the Inverse Law of Sanity.

Consider Neville Chamberlain. Before the Second World War, he was a highly respected businessman from Birmingham, a popular mayor and an esteemed chancellor of the exchequer. He was charming, sober, smart—sane.

Winston Churchill, by contrast, rose to prominence during the Boer War and the first World War. Temperamental, cranky, talkative, bombastic—he bothered many people. During the "wilderness" years of the 1930s, while the suave Chamberlain got all the plaudits, Churchill's own party rejected him.

When not irritably manic in his temperament, Churchill experienced recurrent severe depressive episodes, during many of which he was suicidal. Even into his later years, he would complain about his "black dog" and avoided ledges and railway platforms, for fear of an impulsive jump. "All it takes is an instant," he said.

Abraham Lincoln famously had many depressive episodes, once even needing a suicide watch, and was treated for melancholy by physicians. Mental illness has touched even saintly icons like Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr., both of whom made suicide attempts in adolescence and had at least three severe depressive episodes in adulthood.

Aristotle was the first to point out the link between madness and genius, including not just poets and artists but also political leaders. I would argue that the Inverse Law of Sanity also applies to more ordinary endeavors. In business, for instance, the sanest of CEOs may be just right during prosperous times, allowing the past to predict the future. But during a period of change, a different kind of leader—quirky, odd, even mentally ill—is more likely to see business opportunities that others cannot imagine.

In looking back at historical figures, I do not speculate about their relationships with their mothers or their dark sexual secrets, the usual stuff of "psychohistory." Instead, I base my diagnoses on the most widely accepted sources of psychiatric evidence: symptoms, family history, course of illness, and treatment. How, then, might the leadership of these extraordinary men have been enhanced by mental illness?

An obvious place to start is with depression, which has been shown to encourage traits of both realism and empathy (though not necessarily in the same individual at the same time).

"Normal" nondepressed persons have what psychologists call "positive illusion"—that is, they possess a mildly high self-regard, a slightly inflated sense of how much they control the world around them.

Mildly depressed people, by contrast, tend to see the world more clearly, more as it is. In one classic study, subjects pressed a button and observed whether it turned on a green light, which was actually controlled by the researchers. Those who had no depressive symptoms consistently overestimated their control over the light; those who had some depressive symptoms realized they had little control.

For Lincoln, realism bordering on political ruthlessness was central to his success as a war leader. Few recall that Lincoln was not a consistent abolitionist. He always opposed slavery, but until 1863 he also opposed abolishing it, which is why he was the compromise Republican candidate in 1860. Lincoln preferred a containment strategy. He simply wanted to prevent slavery's expansion to the West, after which, he believed, it would die out gradually.

When the Civil War came, Lincoln showed himself to be flexible and pragmatic as a strategist, willing to admit error and to change generals as the situation demanded. He was not the stereotypical decisive executive, picking a course of action and sticking with it. He adapted to a changing reality and, in the end, prevailed.

As for Churchill, during his severely depressed years in the political wilderness, he saw the Nazi menace long before others did. His exhortations to increase military spending were rejected by Prime Minister Baldwin and his second-in-command, Chamberlain. When Chamberlain returned from signing the Munich agreement with Hitler in 1938, only Churchill and a small coterie refused to stand and cheer in parliament, eliciting boos and hisses from other honorable members.

At dinner that night, Churchill brooded: How could men of such honor do such a dishonorable thing? The depressive leader saw the events of his day with a clarity and realism lacking in saner, more stable men.

Depression also has been found to correlate with high degrees of empathy, a greater concern for how others think and feel. In one study, severely depressed patients had much higher scores on the standard measures of empathy than did a control group of college students; the more depressed they were, the higher their empathy scores. This was the case even when patients were not currently depressed but had experienced depression in the past. Depression seems to prepare the mind for a long-term habit of appreciating others' point of view.

In this we can see part of the motivation behind the radical politics of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. Their goal was not to defeat their opponents but to heal them of their false beliefs. Nonviolent resistance, King believed, was psychiatry for the American soul; it was a psychological cure for racism, not just a political program. And the active ingredient was empathy.

Gandhi and King succeeded to a degree, of course, but they also failed: India was fatally divided because Hindus and Muslims could not accept each other; segregation ended in the U.S., but it happened slowly and at the cost of social traumas whose consequences still afflict us. The politics of radical empathy proved, in the end, to be beyond the capacity of the normal, mentally healthy public.

Great crisis leaders are not like the rest of us; nor are they like mentally healthy leaders. When society is happy, they toil in sadness, seeking help from friends and family and doctors as they cope with an illness that can be debilitating, even deadly. Sometimes they are up, sometimes they are down, but they are never quite well.

When traditional approaches begin to fail, however, great crisis leaders see new opportunities. When the past no longer guides the future, they invent a new future. When old questions are unanswerable and new questions unrecognized, they create new solutions. They are realistic enough to see painful truths, and when calamity occurs, they can lift up the rest of us.

Their weakness is the secret of their strength.

—Dr. Ghaemi is a professor of psychiatry at Tufts University School of Medicine and director of the Mood Disorders Program at Tufts Medical Center. This essay is adapted from his new book, "A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links Between Leadership and Mental Illness."

WIRED:Bill Would Force Intel Chief to Renounce ‘Secret Patriot Act’

Bill Would Force Intel Chief to Renounce ‘Secret Patriot Act’

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/bill-would-force-intel-chief-to-rebuke-secret-patriot-act/

For months, two Senators have screamed bloody murder that the government holds a secret legal interpretation of the Patriot Act so broad that it amounts to a whole different law giving the feds massive domestic surveillance powers. Now, a measure by Sens. Ron Wyden and Mark Udall would force the U.S. intelligence chief, and by extension the entire intelligence community, to admit that they went too far in their Patriot Act interpretations — if they don’t find a way to wiggle out of it.

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets Thursday to prepare the annual bill authorizing the U.S. intelligence agency’s operations. During that “mark-up” process, Wyden and Udall will ask their colleagues to include a measure compelling the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to produce a “detailed assessment of the problems posed by the reliance of government agencies” (.pdf) on “interpretations of domestic surveillance authorities that are inconsistent with the understanding of such authorities by the public.” Wyden’s staff provided Danger Room with a copy of the proposed amendment.

Specifically, Attorney General Eric Holder and Director of National Intelligence James Clapper would have to produce “a plan for addressing such problems” with secret legal interpretations regarding the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and the Patriot Act, the government’s two most important domestic spying laws.

The bill, though, doesn’t force Holder and Clapper to roll back those secret interpretations. They’ve just got to basically admit they’ve messed up. Even if Wyden and Udall can get their colleagues to sign on to their effort, it would be naive to think the nation’s top prosecutor and intelligence officer are so thick that they can’t find an artful way of saying they’ve done nothing wrong.

The irony is that this week, Clapper’s office conceded to the Senate panel that they have indeed been secretly re-interpreting the Patriot Act. A letter from a Clapper aide to Wyden and Udall implied as much (.pdf), and pledged to consider making those secret interpretations public. And Tuesday, the Obama administration’s nominee to lead the National Counterterrorism Center, Matthew Olsen, acknowledged that “some of the pleadings and opinions related to the Patriot Act” to the secret Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court that approves snooping warrants “are classified.”

Olsen, who currently serves as the top lawyer for the National Security Agency, added that “similar” secret interpretations exist for the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, which already expanded FISA’s scope for what some consider blanket surveillance.

Under Wyden and Udall’s amendment, Holder and Clapper would have to deliver a public assessment to the intelligence committees in the House and Senate about the perfidies of secret surveillance law within 60 days of passage.

It’s entirely unclear whether they’ve got the votes to get their measure into the intelligence bill. Not many senators on the intelligence panel signed on to Wyden and Udall’s outrage about secret expansions of the Patriot Act when they unveiled their worries in May. A vote on sending the intel bill to the full Senate could happen as early as Thursday. Even if it passes, it’s essentially up to Holder and Clapper to decide how much wrongdoing they want to admit to in the letter.

“It is critical that officials of the United States not secretly reinterpret public laws in a manner that is inconsistent with the public’s understanding of such laws,” Wyden and Udall’s proposal reads, “and not describe the execution of such laws in a way that misinforms or misleads the public.”

WIRED:Here’s How U.S. Spies Will Find You Through Your Pics

Here’s How U.S. Spies Will Find You Through Your Pics

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/07/spies-find-you-through-pics/

Iarpa, the intelligence community’s way-out research shop, wants to know where you took that vacation picture over the Fourth of July. It wants to know where you took that snapshot with your friends when you were at that New Year’s Eve party. Oh yeah, and if you happen to be a terrorist and you took a photo with some of your buddies while prepping for a raid, the agency definitely wants to know where you took that picture — and it’s looking for ideas to help figure it out.

In an announcement for its new “Finder” program, the agency says that it is looking for ways to geolocate (a fancy word for “locate” that implies having coordinates for a place) images by extracting data from the images themselves and using this to make guesses about where they were taken.

More and more digital cameras today don’t just take pictures but also capture what is called metadata — often referred to as data about data — that can include everything from when the picture was taken to what kind of camera was used to where the it was taken. This metadata, often stored in a format called EXIF, can be used by different programs to understand different aspects of the image — and also by intelligence analysts to understand different aspects of the user who took it, and the people who are in it. Like who they are, what they are doing, and where and when they did it.

Sounds great! But there are a few small problems.

First, not all images are digital. Those old pictures of your parents that you scanned? No metadata. Also, not all digital image formats support metadata. That BMP file you’ve got from 1996? No metadata there, either. Next, even if the image format supports metadata, not all digital images are captured with it. Or they are, but they aren’t captured with a full set. That picture from your old-model Flip phone? No metadata there, or not enough metadata. Also, many popular websites — for example Facebook — strip EXIF tags. So it’s not possible to get the metadata unless you can somehow get access to the source file — which means hacking.

All that means that there are a lot of images out there with no metadata and/or with metadata that you can’t get to very easily. But these images might still have visual information within the image, or other clues, that could enable a system — either completely automated or using automated and human processes together — to make a guess about where the image was taken. The best case for intelligence analysts would be a fully automated system. This way they could suck in images from a terrorist website, download them off of captured cameras or cell phones, or scan them from hard copy, and feed all this through the system and get locations of where the images were taken. With more and more images being created in our world every day this automated approach is going to be crucial.

You can already see a little bit of this happening with the new Google Image Search. The new Google Image Search has a “reverse image search” capability that enables you to search for other instances of the same image on the web. In most cases, this is limited to the exact same image. For example, open up Google Image Search into a second browser window and drag in this image:

No matches. So is this helicopter flying over Khost Province in Afghanistan or flying over the back side of the Hollywood sign? Hard to tell from the image itself. And if you test out typing both “Khost Province” and “Hollywood” into the search bar, you’ll get results that point in both directions. Even for a trained human analyst, this might prove too hard to crack (although the lack of rocket pods on this helicopter makes a good case for this not being an MH-6 Little Bird, which points to Hollywood over Khost).

But for some places that have been photographed over and over again, Google can guess where the image was taken. Drag this into Image Search:

If you didn’t guess already, or if you’re still figuring out Image Search, or if you’re impatient, or if you’re just lazy, here’s a hint: It’s the Grand Canyon. Not too hard for Google to guess because so many people have shot it. When it works like this, Google Image Search is almost like a biometrics program for places.

There is also a middle ground where there will probably still be a place for the human, probably with the images that also have some text data associated with them, where skills of not just pattern matching but intuition will be useful.

The caption for this image reads “An Mi-17 helicopter flies to Kabul, coming back from a humanitarian assistance mission in Baharak, Badakhshan province, Afghanistan.” If you didn’t know it was Afghanistan you might think you were looking at the Sierras, but once you know it’s Afghanistan, and Badakshan province, and near Baharak, and taken on a flight from Baharak to Kabul, and you take a look at the big peak in the background and the distinctive runoff pattern in the foothill at the bottom of the frame, a trained analyst might be able to poke around in a 3D visualization program like GoogleEarth and say that the picture was taken around here:

Iarpa will probably look for combinations of both of these approaches, but on an industrial scale. It’s a hard problem, but even now we are starting to see the beginnings of the solution even in the commercial world. And you better believe that it’s not just spooks who want to know where images were taken. Google, Facebook, Apple and all the other internet and social media giants are probably looking to do the same thing so that they can better understand where their users are and what they are doing there.

So before long your Facebook or Google+ account will be automatically tagging who is in your pictures and where they were taken…

…and spooks might be, too.

Friday, July 29, 2011

LATIMES:U.S. boosting efforts against Al Qaeda in Pakistan The terrorist organization is susceptible to a decisive blow in the wake of Osama bin Laden

U.S. boosting efforts against Al Qaeda in Pakistan

The terrorist organization is susceptible to a decisive blow in the wake of Osama bin Laden's death, a senior Obama administration official says.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/sc-dc-0730-us-al-qaeda-20110730,0,4970286.story

The U.S. is "doubling down" on its strategy of covert targeted missile strikes in Pakistan in the wake of Osama bin Laden's death, believing that Al Qaeda is susceptible to a decisive blow, a senior Obama administration official said Friday.

"I think there are three to five senior leaders that if they're removed from the battlefield, would jeopardize Al Qaeda's capacity to regenerate," said retired Gen. Douglas Lute, who oversees Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy at the National Security Council. He declined to name them, other than Ayman al Zawahiri, who succeeded Bin Laden as Al Qaeda's leader.

"We've got to take advantage of the fact that when Bin Laden died, Al Qaeda was in uncharted waters," Lute said. "This is a period of turbulence.... You need to go for the knockout punch."

Lute's comments were an unusually explicit statement of the thinking behind the administration's increased reliance on drones and other forms of remote attack against Al Qaeda. He avoided specifically referring to drone strikes, which are not officially acknowledged by the government, and instead talked of covert programs in Pakistan. But his meaning was clear.

In a candid assessment, Lute also said the administration had not envisioned the extent to which senior Pakistani officials would be embarrassed less by the presence of Bin Laden in their country than by the U.S. raid to kill him without their knowledge.

"We underestimated somewhat the humiliation factor generated by the raid itself," he said.

Lute's remarks in a panel discussion at the Aspen Security Forum here came after he was asked to respond to comments Thursday night by retired Adm. Dennis Blair, who was forced to resign last year as director of national intelligence. Blair, who left after Obama sided with the CIA in a series of policy disputes between that agency and Blair's office, said drone strikes have become counterproductive because they are provoking public outrage in Pakistan and potentially creating new enemies.

Blair said the U.S. should offer Pakistan the chance to "put two hands on the trigger" as a partner in the program — and therefore only carry out strikes the Pakistanis approve. As it stands, he said, the attacks are undertaken without consultation with Pakistan's government, despite occasional cooperation in the past.

Blair also argued against the U.S. conducting unilateral drone strikes in Yemen and Somalia.

"We're treating the countries just as places where we go and attack," he said.

Blair's comments marked the first time a former Obama administration official had publicly criticized a key tenet of the president's national security strategy.

His views on drone attacks were repudiated by other former senior government officials attending the Aspen conference, including former California Congresswoman Jane Harman, a Democrat who chaired a homeland security intelligence subcommittee.

"Drone attacks … are a crucial tool in our counter-terrorism arsenal and I support them," she said.

The disagreement is part of a broader debate over the efficacy of relatively low-cost drone strikes versus the far more expensive, long-term use of troops on the ground to wage a sustained counter-terrorism campaign. The administration has moved to draw down U.S. troop strength in the region, believing that the costs are unsustainable.

Blair argued that the key to defeating Al Qaeda was for the Pakistani military to mount a sustained counterinsurgency to clear and hold the Afghanistan border areas where the group's leaders have taken refuge.

Lute, reflecting the administration's view, noted that Pakistan's military has a presence in those areas, but despite billions in U.S. aid, its army has shown neither the willingness nor the capacity to root out militants.

Asked about the current threat posed by Al Qaeda, Lute echoed comments made here Thursday by Michael Leiter, who recently departed as head of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Al Qaeda has been wounded, but not yet defeated, he said, adding, "We're not ready to declare victory."

Leiter had said that Al Qaeda's leaders in Pakistan were "on the ropes," but the organization remained capable of attacks and "Pakistan remains a huge problem" because it allows safe haven for Al Qaeda and affiliated groups in its tribal areas along the Afghan border.

nytimes:White House Adviser says U.S. Has 6 Months to ‘Knock Out’ Rattled Qaeda Leadership

White House Adviser says U.S. Has 6 Months to ‘Knock Out’ Rattled Qaeda Leadership

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/30/world/30policy.html

ASPEN, Colo. — President Obama’s top adviser on Pakistan said Friday that the United States had six months to deliver “a knockout blow” to Al Qaeda’s senior leadership in Pakistan while the group was still in turmoil after the killing of Osama bin Laden.

The adviser, Douglas E. Lute, a deputy national security adviser, said the United States needed to increase covert action in Pakistan to take advantage of the disarray within Al Qaeda’s senior ranks.

His comment was widely interpreted to refer to drone strikes, although he did not refer to the operations by name. The United States does not publicly acknowledge the drone strikes, which are classified. “This is a period of turbulence for our enemy,” Mr. Lute said in rare public remarks at a security forum here. “This is the time to double down on the opportunity to defeat Al Qaeda.”

Killing or capturing the group’s half-dozen or so top leaders in the next six months would “seriously degrade Al Qaeda’s ability to regenerate,” he said. “We need to go for the knockout punch in this window of opportunity.”

The comments by Mr. Lute, a retired three-star Army general who has served Presidents Obama and George W. Bush, were the most specific public description of the Obama administration’s military strategy against Al Qaeda’s surviving leadership since Bin Laden’s death in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2.

In the prelude to Mr. Obama’s announcement last month that he would withdraw 33,000 “surge” troops from Afghanistan by September 2012, administration officials described a plan to rely more and more on counterterrorism missions, many launched into Pakistan from Afghanistan.

Mr. Lute took sharp issue with remarks made Thursday here by Dennis C. Blair, who was forced to resign last year as Director of National Intelligence. Mr. Blair said that the United States should halt all drone strikes carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency in Pakistan’s tribal areas unless they were conducted in cooperation with the Pakistani government. Pakistan has repeatedly called for an end to the strikes.

Mr. Blair said the unilateral American strikes had worsened the administration’s relationship with Islamabad, which has plummeted to new lows since the Navy Seal raid that killed Bin Laden. He suggested giving Pakistan more say in what targets the drones hit and when, despite Pakistan’s record of tipping off militants when it gets advance word of American action. For that reason, Mr. Obama told the Pakistani government nothing about the Bin Laden raid until it was over.

Mr. Lute and Mr. Blair spoke at the Aspen Security Forum at the Aspen Institute here. The New York Times is a media partner of the conference.

Responding to questions from the audience, Mr. Lute acknowledged that the administration failed to anticipate the depth of embarrassment suffered by Pakistan’s military by the revelation that Bin Laden had lived comfortably and with local support in a fortress-like home near a leading Pakistani military academy for more than five years, and that American commandos swooped into their country on a two-and-a-half hour mission undetected and unchallenged.

“We underestimated the humiliation factor,” he said. That reaction has prompted Pakistan’s military to take several steps since the raid to recalibrate its relationship with Washington and distance itself from the Pentagon, including expelling some 150 American Special Forces trainers for Pakistani paramilitary troops.

Despite those tensions, Mr. Lute said the administration had shared with the Pakistani government the names of three to five surviving Qaeda leaders believed to be in Pakistan, including Ayman al-Zawahri, Bin Laden’s longtime deputy and successor. He said that both countries agreed that going after them was a top counterterrorism priority.

The C.I.A has conducted more than half of the 43 drone strikes in Pakistan this year since the raid on May 2, according to the Long War Journal, a Web site that tracks the strikes. That suggests a major acceleration of the effort, despite Pakistan’s complaints.

Mr. Lute’s comments joined the larger debate now roiling the administration over the impact Bin Laden’s death and the Arab Spring movement has had on Al Qaeda’s core leadership in Pakistan.

Some senior officials, including Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, have said the United States is within reach of strategically defeating Al Qaeda in Pakistan.

Mr. Lute said that judgment was premature. “We’re not ready to declare victory here,” he said. Referring to the Al Qaeda’s operations base in Pakistan, sometimes referred to as “Al Qaeda core,” he said, “I’d rate Al Qaeda core wounded and impeded but not yet defeated.”

AP:Former Intel Chief: Stop Drone Strikes(BLAIR)

Former Intel Chief: Stop Drone Strikes

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5i_vszKpmFWmo1ZaF9XyWiodmDqPw?docId=7aee8602921f4f0aa8eef57cadc9b281

ASPEN, Colo. (AP) — Former U.S. intelligence chief Dennis Blair said Friday the U.S. should stop its drone campaign in Pakistan, and reconsider the $80 billion a year it spends to fight terrorism.

Speaking at the Aspen Security Forum, Blair said the CIA's unmanned aircraft operation aimed at al-Qaida is backfiring by damaging the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The former director of national intelligence suggests giving Pakistan more say in what gets hit by drone strikes and when, despite Pakistan's record of tipping off militants when it gets advance word of U.S. action.

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who previously headed the CIA, has lauded the drone campaign as a key tool to take out al-Qaida and other militants in Pakistan's tribal areas. Strikes, which have more than tripled year-to-year under the Obama administration, are done with tacit Pakistani assent, though publicly, Pakistani officials decry the hits. That tension has grown worse after the U.S. unilateral raid into Pakistan May 2 to kill al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden, and an earlier incident in January, when a CIA contractor was held for killing two Pakistani men in Lahore that he said were trying to rob him.

Blair said the continuing drone strikes are more of a nuisance than a real threat to al-Qaida, and that only a ground campaign by Pakistan would truly threaten it and other militant organizations. The U.S. had been training forces for that purpose until the program was canceled by Pakistan in retaliation for the raid to kill Osama bin Laden.

Al Qaida "can sustain its level of resistance to an air-only campaign," he said. "I just see us with that strategy walking out on a thinner and thinner ledge and if even we get to the far end of it, we are not going to lower the fundamental threat to the U.S. any lower than we have it now."

Other conference speakers disagreed with his analysis, including Bush administration veteran Fran Townsend, the former chief counterterrorism adviser in the White House.

"This has been the key tool in degrading the Al Qaida leadership," Townsend said Friday, saying that without it, al-Qaida would be a far greater threat to the homeland.

Stephen Hadley, former national security adviser to President George W. Bush, said the Pakistani government in the past had assented to the strikes, if they were used against major targets.

"The line they drew...was boots on the ground, special (ops) forces in Pakistan," Hadley said. "We did a limited cross-border operation and it caused a huge outcry to the point where we said we're not going to do that anymore" unless it was to get bin Laden or his then-deputy Ayman al-Zawahri, "knowing you're going to pay in Pakistan public opinion. And we did," after bin Laden was killed.

Blair also suggested cutting the cost of hunting terrorists by relying more on local forces, especially in Yemen and Somalia. "Pull back on unilateral actions by the United States, except in extraordinary circumstances," he said.

The U.S. is already also working with indigenous forces in Yemen and Somalia, but also sustains a large and expensive offshore presence aboard a ship off the Yemeni coast, as well as flying armed and observation drones from Djibouti and other sites in the region.

Blair estimated that there are some 4,000 terrorists worldwide, and a budget of some $80 billion devoted to fighting them — a figure he said did not include the wars of Afghanistan or Iraq.

"That's $20 million for each of these people ... Is that proportionate?" he asked. He pointed out that 17 Americans have been killed inside the U.S. by terrorists in the decade since Sept. 11, including the 14 killed in the Ft. Hood massacre, while car accidents and daily crime combined have killed some 1.5 million people during the same 10 years.

"What is it that justifies this amount of money on this narrow problem?" he asked.

Blair, who was forced to resign by the Obama administration, says the White House undermined his authority as director of national intelligence by siding with the CIA, instead of telling it to listen to him.

"They sided enough with the CIA in ways that were public enough that it undercut my position," Blair said.

nytimes(MARCH,2011):Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists

There have been numerous other attacks against aircraft, many of which have been destroyed in flight.

Some of the attacks were devastating: an Air Rhodesia plane was downed by an SA-7 in 1979, killing all 59 people aboard; an American-supported guerrilla group claimed that it downed a Boeing 737 flown by Angolan Airways with a missile in 1983, killing 130 people; the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army used an SA-7 to destroy a Sudan Airways passenger plane in 1986, killing 60 people.

In 1994, a plane carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda was struck by a Manpads, killing both men and setting off genocide in Rwanda.


Experts Fear Looted Libyan Arms May Find Way to Terrorists


March 3, 2011

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/04/world/africa/04weapons.html?_r=1

Security analysts say the armed uprising in Libya poses a long-term security threat — that weapons looted from government stockpiles could circulate widely, including heat-seeking antiaircraft missiles that could be used against civilian airliners.

Photographs and video from the uprising show civilians carrying a full array of what were once the Libyan military’s weapons — like the SA-7, an early-generation, shoulder-fired missile in the same family as the more widely known Stinger — that intelligence agencies have long worried could fall into terrorists’ hands.

They also show large groups of young men equipped with a complete suite of lightweight, simple-to-use and durable infantry arms, including assault rifles, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades, which have been a staple of fighting in Africa and Asia since midway through the cold war. Mines, grenades and several types of antitank missiles can be seen as well.

Past examples of state arsenals being looted by civilians — whether in Uganda in 1979, Albania in 1997 or Iraq in 2003 — have shown that once these weapons slip from state custody they can be sold through black markets, swiftly and quietly, to other countries and groups for use in wars where they can present long-lasting and destabilizing problems. Analysts are particularly concerned about the heat-seeking missiles, known as Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems, or Manpads.

“The danger of these missiles ending up in the hands of terrorists and insurgents outside of Libya is very real,” said Matthew Schroeder, the director of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington. “Securing these missiles should be a top priority of the U.S. intelligence community and their counterparts overseas.”

The principal threat, the analysts said, is not necessarily that the rebels themselves, who want international sympathy and support, might use such weapons against airliners. Rather, the concern is that because these missiles can sell for at least several thousand dollars on black markets, opportunists will gather and offer them to third parties — pushing them into the underground trade.

Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s military was not particularly well-led, competent or large at the start of this conflict, with an army of roughly 45,000 soldiers, according to an assessment by Jane’s Information Group.

But over the decades, Colonel Qaddafi has spent heavily to equip his forces and amass reserve munitions and arms. He has been accused of procuring weapons to pass on to many foreign groups, including Palestinian and Irish fighters, rebel groups and friendly governments in sub-Saharan Africa.

The weapons that have emerged from storehouses in recent days confirm that despite international sanctions, Libya had acquired arms from multiple sellers in the former Eastern bloc, accumulating an arsenal that looks like the bounty of cold war clearance sales.

The rebels’ newly acquired equipment ranges from dilapidated tanks designed more than a half-century ago to relatively recent Russian assault-rifle variants.

Mixed in are rifles of Romanian, Hungarian and Russian provenance, along with crates of ammunition from Norinco, one of the principal arms-manufacturers in China.

Peter Danssaert, a researcher for the International Peace Information Service in Belgium who covers arms proliferation in Eastern Europe and Africa, said that now that the weapons were out of government custody, few would be recovered. “They are gone forever” from state accountability, he said.

Nic Marsh, who researches the small-arms trade for the Peace Research Institute Oslo in Norway, said the weapons could move in many directions, to Chad or Sudan, to Algeria or to Palestinian fighters.

If the battles in Libya turn into a long war, the two sides might actually import more weapons to sustain their fighting. But once the uprising is resolved, if history is a guide, the weapons stand to be sold off piece by piece.

In these cases, as in Albania in the late 1990s, weapons become commodities, and organized smuggling rings can swiftly form to move them on.

Assault rifles in Africa often fetch several hundred dollars apiece. The weapons now circulating in Libya, fresh from arsenals and evidently in good condition, could be worth more — creating an incentive for those who hold them now to dump them onto markets later.

The Manpads, analysts said, are much more difficult to acquire and would command significantly higher prices and attract their own subset of buyers. “When the guys outside the country realize that there are Manpads available, they will try to get them,” Mr. Danssaert said. By “guys,” he said, he meant terrorist organizations.

The precise sources and types of the missiles that the rebels have lifted from stockpiles are not fully clear, and the sample of images remains small.

But photographs by The New York Times clearly show SA-7 missiles, apparently of the so-called SA-7b, an improvement on the original design, Mr. Schroeder said. One image, of the stenciled markings on a launch tube, shows a missile that appears to have been manufactured in November 1977.

The SA-7, an early-model missile, was fielded in the Soviet Union in the late 1960s for use against NATO military planes. There have been multiple manufacturers of SA-7b knockoffs outside the former Soviet Union, including in Egypt, Pakistan, Bulgaria and China.

Carried and fired by a single fighter, the missiles travel at supersonic speeds from a shoulder-fired launcher toward the heat emitted by an aircraft engine, where they detonate a high-explosive charge.

Many modern military planes use countermeasures to confuse such weapons. But very few civilian aircraft do.

Analysts fear that now that these weapons are out of state hands, they will be more easily acquired by groups that could use them against civilian jets, as terrorists did in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002, when two missiles narrowly missed an Israeli plane with 271 people aboard.

There have been numerous other attacks against aircraft, many of which have been destroyed in flight.

Some of the attacks were devastating: an Air Rhodesia plane was downed by an SA-7 in 1979, killing all 59 people aboard; an American-supported guerrilla group claimed that it downed a Boeing 737 flown by Angolan Airways with a missile in 1983, killing 130 people; the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army used an SA-7 to destroy a Sudan Airways passenger plane in 1986, killing 60 people.

In 1994, a plane carrying the presidents of Burundi and Rwanda was struck by a Manpads, killing both men and setting off genocide in Rwanda.

Even Manpads that are not fired, or miss their targets, can cause economic ripples, because aviation companies might be unwilling to service routes in areas where terrorist groups are believed to possess them. “A perceived threat can have an effect,” said Eric Berman, managing director of the Small Arms Survey in Geneva, which has researched the missiles’ proliferation.

In the popular imagination, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles are simple to use and uncannily reliable, but many of them are far from fail-safe.

Most of the missile systems require a degree of training to assemble and fire them effectively, including a sense of the weapons’ minimum and maximum ranges and the degree to which targets should be led.

Moreover, the weapons themselves can malfunction and degrade. The SA-7, for example, has three primary components, including a grip stock that holds the weapon, a battery-cooling unit that is necessary to arm and fire it, and a launch tube that contains the missile itself.

Some of the images from Libya show men carrying only partially assembled systems. Such weapons appear menacing to the passing eye, but unless fully assembled are harmless to passing aircraft.

And even when properly assembled and carried by competent users, other factors — such as how the missiles and batteries were stored, their age, and their provenance — influence whether they will work when fired. “You can have a lot of missiles out there, but many might not be effective,” Mr. Berman said.

The analysts said that in the short term, little could be done about the loose weapons.

Mr. Berman expressed hope that the Libyan government had maintained detailed records of its weapons’ serial numbers, so that after the conflict it would be possible to determine exactly what is missing, and then to organize programs to recover or account for the Manpads, one by one.

The United States government has been active in trying to account for and destroy the missile stockpiles, and underwrote buy-back programs that recovered many of the weapons that disappeared in 2003 from Saddam Hussein’s storehouses in Iraq.

---------------------------------------

telegraph(APRIL):Al-Qaeda could get their hands on Libyan missiles, officials warn Hundreds of hand-held ground to air, heat seeking missiles lying in

Al-Qaeda could get their hands on Libyan missiles, officials warn

Hundreds of hand-held ground to air, heat seeking missiles lying in unguarded weapons depot in Ajdabiya could fall into the hands of al-Qaeda terrorists, Human Rights Watch has warned.

06 Apr 2011

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8432874/Al-Qaeda-could-get-their-hands-on-Libyan-missiles-officials-warn.html

Staff from the human rights charity inspected 35-bunker weapons dump on the eastern outskirts of the Libyan city, which is currently in the hands of rebel forces, which Western intelligence agencies fear are infiltrated by Islamist terror groups.

Peter Bouckaert, a senior Belgian HRW official, found that no guards were defending the depot, allowing civilians to haul away munitions including hundreds of Soviet "Strela" SA-7 anti aircraft missiles.

"When ordinary civilians, even children, can walk into a weapons depot and remove surface-to-air missiles capable of shooting down a civilian aircraft, you have a real problem," he said.

"Once they are fired, these weapons find the heat of jet engines. You can take out low-flying aircraft, including passenger jets taking off."

Mr Bouckaert fears that the chaos in the front line town means that the missiles have fallen into terrorist and referred to a previous 2002 al-Qaeda attempt to shoot down an Israeli jet in Mombasa with an SA-7 weapon.

"The missiles were simply there to be grabbed. Had I wanted, then I could have put one in our car and driven away," he said.

Western intelligence agencies are concerned that terrorists will benefit because the rebel Libyan transitional council is too busy fighting for survival to safeguard munitions depots in areas under its control.

As the Gaddafi regime lost control over eastern Libya last month, anti-government rebels and civilians gained access to massive military weapon and munitions depots, abandoned by government forces.

Human Rights Watch inspected 20 of 35 weapons bunkers in Ajdabiya, as well as heat seeking missiles were thousands of rockets, anti-tank weapons, guns and ammunition.

nytimes:27 Deemed to Be Threats Held Aviation Licenses

27 Deemed to Be Threats Held Aviation Licenses

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/us/29pilot.html?ref=world

WASHINGTON — The Transportation Security Administration cannot determine the real identities of thousands of the people to whom the Federal Aviation Administration has issued licenses as pilots and aircraft mechanics, but has located an additional 27 who should not have held them because of terrorist connections, according to an internal report by the Department of Homeland Security.

The report was requested two years ago by four senators after a private data analysis company in New York determined that the man convicted of bombing Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 still held an F.A.A. license, as did a man caught trying to smuggle military equipment to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a man convicted of trying to make an airborne poison in his basement and a self-described eco-terrorist who fled the country after he was indicted on a charge of arson.

The F.A.A. and the Department of Homeland Security were supposed to scour the list of licensed pilots, mechanics and flight dispatchers for terrorists under a law approved by Congress after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, but they have had difficulties doing so despite having access to much more information than the private company.

The new report, by the inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security, found that the F.A.A. had Social Security numbers of only about 750,000 people out of the 1.3 million names in its Airmen Registry, and that among those for whom it had numbers, more than 15,000 of them did not match the Social Security database for name, sex or date of birth. By law, the F.A.A. cannot require a Social Security number, the report noted, and as a result, “T.S.A. may not identify U.S. citizens who have provided false biographic information to receive an airman certificate.”

Not all of the discrepancies represent a potential security threat; the report said that more extensive study over the past few years found that 8,000 of the license holders were dead.

The report offers no details about the 27 individuals whose certificates were canceled, but does indicate the poor state of federal records, almost a decade after the Sept. 11 attacks. An initial computer scan found about 29,000 certificates that matched names on the government’s Terrorist Screening Database, but further study found that 28,500 of the matches were invalid; 506 were turned over for closer scrutiny, yielding the 27 names.

The report does not mention any technique other than matching names. The New York company, Safe Banking Systems in Mineola, found some of the suspect individuals by matching names. But it contends that names are a poor identifier; they can be misspelled or, if they originate in a non-Roman alphabet, they can be spelled inconsistently when rendered in English. The Libyan convicted in the Lockerbie bombing was listed in F.A.A. records as Abdelbaset Elmegrahi; on the F.B.I.’s 10 Most Wanted list, he was Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi. Safe Banking Systems, using only publicly available data, found some suspect individuals by matching addresses or other data.

The company’s main line of business is to work for banks, matching their lists of depositors with Commerce Department lists of individuals whom banks are not supposed to transact business with because they are connected to terrorists, drug dealers or corrupt foreign officials. While doing those matches, it found some suspect pilots. But the new Homeland Security report does not indicate that the government made use of any of its lists of those suspected of being drug dealers or gun runners and of other individuals except for the Terrorist Screening Database.

Marta R. Metelko, a spokeswoman for the Homeland Security inspector general, said the agency could not answer these questions “without divulging sensitive information.”

John D. Rockefeller IV, one of the senators who requested the investigation, said Thursday that the report “shows that almost 10 years after the 9/11 attacks, the F.A.A. is still not doing enough to verify the identity of airman’s certificate holders and that some certificate holders have connections to terrorism.” Mr. Rockefeller, who is a West Virginia Democrat and chairman of an aviation subcommittee, said that the F.A.A. and Homeland Security were making progress, but that “issuing certificates to people who pose a threat to our aviation system is simply unacceptable.”

nytimes:Ex-Counterterrorism Aide Warns Against Complacency on Al Qaeda

Ex-Counterterrorism Aide Warns Against Complacency on Al Qaeda


http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/29/world/29leiter.html?_r=1&ref=world

ASPEN, Colo. — The recently departed director of the nation’s main counterterrorism center said Thursday that Al Qaeda in Pakistan still posed a serious threat to the United States, and he warned that assessments that Al Qaeda was on the verge of collapse lacked “accuracy and precision.”

The comments by the official, Michael E. Leiter, who stepped down three weeks ago as head of the National Counterterrorism Center, are the most significant pushback to a growing chorus of statements by American officials that the death of Osama bin Laden and years of Central Intelligence Agency drone strikes in Pakistan have brought the United States “within reach of strategically defeating Al Qaeda,” as Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta put it recently.

Mr. Leiter said that Al Qaeda’s leadership and structure in Pakistan were “on the ropes,” but he contended that “the core organization is still there and could launch some attacks” and that “Pakistan remains a huge problem.” He noted that the failed plot to blow up an explosives-packed vehicle in Times Square in May 2010 was carried out by a Pakistani-American trained by the Pakistani Taliban. The Qaeda affiliate in Yemen also remains especially dangerous, he added.

Mr. Leiter also raised concerns that a decade of intensive paramilitary operations by the Central Intelligence Agency in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen had begun to change the nature of the spy service, and not necessarily all for the better.

“The question has to be asked: Has that in some ways diminished some of its strategic, long-term intelligence collection and analysis mission?” he said, citing the potential impact on traditional espionage and analysis of longer-range issues like China and counterproliferation.

As some of America’s wars wind down, Mr. Leiter cautioned about the effects on a generation of young analysts and officers from the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies who have been pushed forward into adrenaline-surging counterterrorism missions overseas. They could return to headquarters, he said, and find themselves bored by doing the still-important jobs of analysts or case officers — what he called the “crown jewel” of the C.I.A.’s work.

“Suddenly you find yourself at a desk in Washington working in a pretty big bureaucracy and you say: “This what I’m stuck with for another 30 years? You’ve got to be kidding me,’ ” Mr. Leiter said.

Mr. Leiter spoke in a wide-ranging, hourlong interview at the Aspen Security Forum at the Aspen Institute here. The New York Times is a media sponsor of the four-day conference, and Mr. Leiter was interviewed by David E. Sanger, The Times’s chief Washington correspondent.

In the wake of Bin Laden’s death in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on May 2, a growing debate has taken hold among American and other Western intelligence and counterterrorism specialists over how close the United States may be to dismantling Al Qaeda’s main network in Pakistan.

President Obama’s choice to replace Mr. Leiter, Matthew Olsen, who is the general counsel at the National Security Agency, said at his confirmation hearing this week before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he would define the strategic defeat of Al Qaeda as “ending the threat that Al Qaeda and all of its affiliates pose to the United States and its interests around the world.”

Seth G. Jones, a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation who until February worked on Afghanistan and Pakistan issues for United States Special Operations Command, expressed caution about the idea that Al Qaeda in Pakistan is on its last legs. “Central Al Qaeda and a mix of other groups in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia are capable of pulling off an attack in the U.S. homeland,” he said.

In an assessment drawn from nearly four years as head of the counterterrorism center, Mr. Leiter warned that while Al Qaeda’s ability to pull off another attack on the scale of Sept. 11 has greatly diminished, smaller attacks carried out by the remaining leadership of Al Qaeda or Qaeda franchises, or adherents in Yemen and Somalia, or possibly by homegrown terrorists in the United States, could still cause tremendous physical, psychological and emotional damage.

“Small events can still have a strategic impact,” he said.

He cited the bombing and shooting spree last week in Norway, apparently by one man, that killed at least 76 people, as well as the attacks by gunmen in Mumbai, India, in November 2008 that left more than 160 people dead, including 6 Americans.

Asked what advice he would give the American public about the current threat, Mr. Leiter said he would stress how much progress the country had made in the past 10 years against terrorist attacks, but he also said people should not overreact to what he said would inevitably be future strikes.

“The American people do need to understand that at least the smaller-scale terrorist attacks are with us for the foreseeable future,” he said.

“The way that we fundamentally defeat that threat, which is very difficult to stop in its entirety, is to maintain a culture of resilience,” Mr. Leiter said. “Although this threat of terrorism is real and there will be tragic events that lead to the deaths of innocent people, it is not, in my view, an existential threat to our society.”

guardian:Qassem Suleimani: the Iranian general 'secretly running' Iraq

gu

Martin Chulov reports on the elusive Iranian with so much Iraqi influence that Baghdadis believe he is controlling the country

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/28/qassem-suleimani-iran-iraq-influence


There's a story that the new CIA director, David Petraeus, likes to tell which harks back to his days as a four-star general in Iraq.

Early in 2008, during a series of battles between the US and Iraqi army on one side and the Shia militias on the other, Petraeus was handed a phone with a text message from the Iranian general who had by then become his nemesis.

The message came from the head of Iran's elite al-Quds Force, Qassem Suleimani, and was conveyed by a senior Iraqi leader. It read: "General Petraeus, you should know that I, Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who's going to replace him is a Quds Force member."

Petraeus hardly needed to be told. Much of the US military's work with Iraq's Shia Muslims had been undermined by Suleimani and the client militias of the Iranian general's al-Quds force. So too had US government diplomatic efforts elsewhere in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon.

Petraeus last year told a thinktank, the Institute for the Study of War, about the problem Suleimani created for him: "Now, that makes diplomacy difficult if you think that you're going to do the traditional means of diplomacy by dealing with another country's ministry of foreign affairs because in this case, it is not the ministry. It is a security apparatus."

As he prepared for the job of the US's most senior spy, Petraeus would surely have been preparing for further shadow boxing. Suleimani's reputation as the most formidable operator in the region has not diminished in the past three years. By some measures it has actually increased: Syria now also comes within Suleimani's sphere of influence.

The strength of the ties between Suleimani and Iraqi legislators has been revealed during weeks of interviews with key officials, including those who admire him and those who fear the man like no other.

Iraq's former state security minister, Sharwan al-Waeli is one who knows Suleimani well. A formal conversation between the Guardian and al-Waeli last year took on a very different tone as soon as Suleimani's name was mentioned.

The Shia legislator was a known ally of Iran, so much so that he was seen by secularists and Sunnis in parliament as someone prepared to do Iran's bidding. He denied Iran played a pervasive role in Iraq until he was interrupted with a question that Iraqi officials have long prefered to ignore: when was the last time Qassem Suleimani came to the Green Zone, the fortified government district in the heart of Baghdad?

Al-Waeli's left hand trembled slightly and his brow furrowed. "You mean Sayed Qassem Suleimani," he said, giving Suleimani an Arabic honorific reserved for the most esteemed of men. He refused to elaborate.

In Baghdad, no other name invokes the same sort of reaction among the nation's power base – discomfort, uncertainty and fear.

"He is the most powerful man in Iraq without question," Iraq's former national security minister, Mowaffak al-Rubaie, said recently. "Nothing gets done without him."

Until now, however, few Iraqis have dared to talk openly about the enigmatic Iranian general, what role he plays in Iraq and how he shapes key agendas like no one else.

"They are too busy dealing with the aftermath," said a senior US official. "He dictates terms then makes things happen and the Iraqis are left managing a situation that they had no input into."

Suleimani's journey to supremacy in Iraq is rooted in the Islamic revolution of 1979, which ousted the Shah and recast Iran as a fundamentalist Shia Islamic state. He rose steadily through the ranks of the Iranian military until 2002 when, months before the US invasion of Iraq, he was appointed to command the most elite unit of the Iranian military – the al-Quds force of the Revolutionary Guards Corp.

The al-Quds force has no equal in Iran. Its stated primary task is to protect the revolution. However, its mandate has also been interpreted as exporting the revolution's goals to other parts of the Islamic world.

Shia communities throughout the region have proved fertile grounds for revolutionary messages and have formed deep and abiding partnerships with the al-Quds force. So too have several Sunni groups opposed to Israel – first among them Hamas in Gaza.

But Iraq has been Suleimani's key arena. The last eight years have witnessed a proxy war between Suleimani's Quds force and the US military, the full effects of which are still being played out, as the US prepares for a full departure from Iraq and Iraq's leaders ponder over whether to ask them to stay.

Arabian heartland

At stake is no less than who gets to shape the destiny of the heartland of Arabia. "His power comes straight from (the country's lead cleric Ayatollah) Khamenei," said one of Iraq's three deputy prime ministers, Saleh al-Mutlaq, a secular Sunni. "It bypasses everyone else, including Ahmadinejad.

"There is a saying in Islam that you should never get angry with your father or mother. The [Shia] interpret that as meaning what (Khamanei, via Suleimani) says has to be respected by every [Shia] inside, or outside Iran.

"All of the important people in Iraq go to see him," said Mutlaq. "People are mesmerised by him – they see him like an angel."

A second MP – a senior member of Prime Minister Nour al-Maliki's inner circle who regularly meets Suleimani in Iran – said the general has only travelled once to Iraq in the past eight years. He described him as "softly spoken and reasonable, very polite". "He is simple when you talk to him. You would not know how powerful he is without knowing his background. His power is absolute and no one can challenge this."

Silver-haired, slight and with a perennial serene smile, Suleimani comes across as the most unlikely of warlords. Those who met him during the one time he traveled to Baghdad at the height of the 2006 sectarian conflict say he walked around the compounds of his two key hosts without bodyguards. The Americans did not know he had been in the capital until he was back in Iran and were deeply unhappy to learn that their arch enemy had been among them.

"He is indeed like Keyser Söze," said a senior US official this week – in reference to the legendary villain in the The Usual Suspects, whose ruthlessness and influence terrified everyone. "Nobody knew who he was and this guy's the same. He is everywhere, but nowhere."

The senior Shia MP added: "He has managed to form links with every single Shia group, on every level. Last year, in the meeting in Damascus that formed the current Iraqi government, he was present at the meeting along with leaders from Syria, Turkey, Iran and Hezbollah. "He forced them all to change their mind and anoint Maliki as leader for a second term."

Over the five years that Maliki has been in power in Iraq, all his key advisers have been granted court in Iran by Suleimani. Iraq's president, a Kurd – Jalal Talabani, has also regularly met the general, sometimes along the border separating both countries.

The Syrian uprising has added a new dimension. The al-Quds Force has been involved in suppressing the Syrian uprising, according to multiple sources inside and outside the country.

The US has slapped personal sanctions on Suleimani and two other generals in the Iranian security forces who it accuses of helping orchestrate the crackdown that is believed to have killed more than 1,600 civilians."

Tehran has heavily invested in the survival of embattled Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, whose ruling Allawite clan has links to Shia Islam. Assad's fall would be a serious strategic setback for Iran and Suleimani. It is perhaps the only part of the region where the general's preferred mix of strategic diplomacy with aggressive operations is being strongly tested.

In the meantime, the work of the al-Quds force continues in Iraq. All but two of the US troops killed in June – the highest number in more than two years, were killed by client militias directly under Suleimani's control, the Keta'ib Hezbollah and the Promised Day Brigades.

"It is clear that the al-Quds force is responsible," said the director general of the intelligence division in Iraq's interior ministry, Hussein Kamal. "There has been a systematic flow of weapons into Iraq for the past eight years. Of course they try to say it is not state-sponsored. But when weapons are flowing from the borders of a sovereign state, it is very clear where the blame lies.

"They are destructive weapons and they cannot deny the responsibility for them."

Another Shia MP said he had personally asked Suleimani why his al-Quds force continued to smuggle weapons, many of which are taken into the Green Zone, where he and most of Maliki's inner circle live. "He just smiled and said it is nothing to do with me," the MP said. "He said he had no idea where the weapons were coming from."

Suleimani has been variously described by those who dislike him – Iraq's Sunnis, and those who have spent years trying to get his measure – as a "talented extortionist" and a highly skilled wheeler-dealer.

US officials who have spent years trying to disrupt the work of his loyalists say they would like to meet him, while at the same time being puzzled as to his objectives.

"I would simply ask him what he wants from us," said a senior US military official. In addition to the soldiers killed this year, the US ambassador in Baghdad, James Jeffrey, said last summer that Iranian proxies accounted for roughly a quarter of US combat casualties in Iraq – around 1,100 deaths and many thousands more injuries.

Despite this, the US has landed few public blows on Suleimani's close circle.

In March 2007, the British SAS captured a senior Hezbollah official, Ali Moussa Daqduq, who had allegedly planned an operation that killed seven soldiers in Karbala. The same year, US troops also captured two men in the Kurdish north who they believed were al-Quds leaders. Apart from that, the trophy cabinet remains bare – at least publicly. More troubling than the apparent dearth of tactical victories is how the rest of the year will play out.

The US – and some key neighbouring Sunni states – believe Iran's strategy in Iraq as the conflict winds down is to keep the country in a permanent but manageable state of chaos.

"They keep it on simmer and turn it up and down when they want to," said one Lebanese official in Beirut.

The senior US military spokesman in Iraq, Major General Jeffrey Buchanan agreed. "Their overall strategy has been to keep [Iraq] isolated from the rest of its neighbours and from the US, because that makes it likely that it will depend on Iran. They want Iraq to play a subordinate, weak role."

Only Iraq's lawmakers can stop the master-client relationship from becoming entrenched here. It's a task that Kurdish legislator in the national parliament, Mahmoud Othman, fears may prove to be beyond his colleagues.

"Qassem Suleimani is the key man to every decision taken in Iraq," he said.

"It is a shame to have such a man playing such a role in this country. There should be a relationship between equals like normal relations with normal states."