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| Start reading Obama and the Middle East: The End of America's Moment? on your Kindle in under a minute. Don't have a Kindle? Get your Kindle here, or download a FREE Kindle Reading App. |
Obama and the Middle East:
The End of America's Moment?
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
By Michael T
Format:Hardcover
This is an important book because the subjects it surveys - America's critically important relationships in the Middle East, and why they are in parlous shape - are in urgent need of informed debate. Professor Gerges captures and explains much of what Obama inherited, what he has changed for the better and where his rhetoric has outstripped performance. His key conclusion is that Obama has repeatedly lacked the courage of his convictions, was a politician rather than a statesman - was "timid" - particularly in dealing with Israel's Bibi Netanyahu and the Israeli occupation. He acknowledges the substantial obstacles to change, both in Congress and in the region. However, the book does not persuasively demonstrate that Obama had policy options that he chose not to use; that those options were not effectively blocked in Congress; that, when implemented, such policies would have overcome intransigent Israeli resistance; and that the likely costs to other elements of the administration's program were tolerable.
Gerges does a wonderful job of describing what American policy should be, and what effects it should have on the ground. For those of us who agree with him wholeheartedly, it is critical to understand what keeps the changes from happening. And it may be that facts will eventually become available to show that Obama could have faced Netanyahu (and his friends) down and forced a reversal in longstanding Israeli policy. But as Gerges notes, "Israeli politicians," including Netanyahu and former opposition leader Tzipi Livni, "have made a conscious decision that keeping Palestinian lands is more important" than peace at the cost of much of that land. Without Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian polity that is in meaningful ways sovereign or independent, a sustainable solution is scarcely conceivable. If the minds of the current Israeli leadership cannot be changed, American policy would have to be geared to convincing the Israeli public to change its leadership and commit to a new course. That might require conditioning American economic, military, and political support on changes in Israeli policy to make it dramatically clear to Israeli voters that the "status quo," which is really a ratcheting process leading to a dark future, is not sustainable.
George H. W. Bush did something close to that in 1991, persuading Israelis that the stiff-necked positions of Yitzhak Shamir were doing unnecessary damage to the relationship with the US. But Bush was in a very different position from that of Obama. He had just won the Gulf War, and had great credibility with the public and the Congress on matters of national security. Israel believed (incorrectly, as it happened) that it needed massive US housing loan guarantees, something Bush could block. Shamir was a rough cob, not adept at American politics. And waiting in the wings was Yitzhak Rabin, the man with unparalleled credibility and an announced willingness to negotiate. Obama faces a Congress dedicated to several dubious propositions: that in an era obsessed with "terrorists," all of Israel's adversaries are terrorists; that Israel is a democratic and reliable ally; and that distance from Israel or its American advocates risks defeat at the polls. Bibi is stronger than any prior Israeli premier, totally committed to the settler project, has no serious contenders for leadership, and plays American politics like an old ward boss. Bibi doesn't need a new, large aid program, just the continuation of those already entrenched in congressional commitments. Even given these differences, Bush moved the ball very little, giving Rabin everything he asked for (including massive increases in settlement construction) in return for talks that eventuated in the fatally flawed Oslo Accords.
Obama's mistake may have been in confronting Netanyahu several times on the settlement issue without a Plan B to implement when Bibi decided he could stiff this president. Perhaps Obama could have abstained or voted for the 2011 Security Council resolutions that he instead vetoed (condemning settlements in Obama's own words, and seeking Palestinian UN membership). That would have created a domestic political firestorm, but it would also have stunned Israelis and caused intense debate on whether Bibi's mismanagement of the relationship with Obama was too costly to countenance. Such decisions are at least within the president's discretion, whereas conditioning ongoing aid is relatively easy for congressional friends of Israel to block. The other questions would still remain: would Israel change major policies in substantial and sustained ways; and would the cost of the effort be tolerable, as the Congress added constraints and penalties to every bill? Doubtful, on each question.
That, in a nutshell, is the case for skepticism that Obama could have achieved anything except a bloody head in running a few more times into this particular wall. In spite of such cavils, Professor Gerges' book is a searching, thorough review of a critical set of problems in American policy, including those relating to Iran and terrorism. Hopefully it will help to engender a re-thinking of priorities and the kind of policy changes that Obama speaks of but has not yet brought about.
Gerges does a wonderful job of describing what American policy should be, and what effects it should have on the ground. For those of us who agree with him wholeheartedly, it is critical to understand what keeps the changes from happening. And it may be that facts will eventually become available to show that Obama could have faced Netanyahu (and his friends) down and forced a reversal in longstanding Israeli policy. But as Gerges notes, "Israeli politicians," including Netanyahu and former opposition leader Tzipi Livni, "have made a conscious decision that keeping Palestinian lands is more important" than peace at the cost of much of that land. Without Israeli acceptance of a Palestinian polity that is in meaningful ways sovereign or independent, a sustainable solution is scarcely conceivable. If the minds of the current Israeli leadership cannot be changed, American policy would have to be geared to convincing the Israeli public to change its leadership and commit to a new course. That might require conditioning American economic, military, and political support on changes in Israeli policy to make it dramatically clear to Israeli voters that the "status quo," which is really a ratcheting process leading to a dark future, is not sustainable.
George H. W. Bush did something close to that in 1991, persuading Israelis that the stiff-necked positions of Yitzhak Shamir were doing unnecessary damage to the relationship with the US. But Bush was in a very different position from that of Obama. He had just won the Gulf War, and had great credibility with the public and the Congress on matters of national security. Israel believed (incorrectly, as it happened) that it needed massive US housing loan guarantees, something Bush could block. Shamir was a rough cob, not adept at American politics. And waiting in the wings was Yitzhak Rabin, the man with unparalleled credibility and an announced willingness to negotiate. Obama faces a Congress dedicated to several dubious propositions: that in an era obsessed with "terrorists," all of Israel's adversaries are terrorists; that Israel is a democratic and reliable ally; and that distance from Israel or its American advocates risks defeat at the polls. Bibi is stronger than any prior Israeli premier, totally committed to the settler project, has no serious contenders for leadership, and plays American politics like an old ward boss. Bibi doesn't need a new, large aid program, just the continuation of those already entrenched in congressional commitments. Even given these differences, Bush moved the ball very little, giving Rabin everything he asked for (including massive increases in settlement construction) in return for talks that eventuated in the fatally flawed Oslo Accords.
Obama's mistake may have been in confronting Netanyahu several times on the settlement issue without a Plan B to implement when Bibi decided he could stiff this president. Perhaps Obama could have abstained or voted for the 2011 Security Council resolutions that he instead vetoed (condemning settlements in Obama's own words, and seeking Palestinian UN membership). That would have created a domestic political firestorm, but it would also have stunned Israelis and caused intense debate on whether Bibi's mismanagement of the relationship with Obama was too costly to countenance. Such decisions are at least within the president's discretion, whereas conditioning ongoing aid is relatively easy for congressional friends of Israel to block. The other questions would still remain: would Israel change major policies in substantial and sustained ways; and would the cost of the effort be tolerable, as the Congress added constraints and penalties to every bill? Doubtful, on each question.
That, in a nutshell, is the case for skepticism that Obama could have achieved anything except a bloody head in running a few more times into this particular wall. In spite of such cavils, Professor Gerges' book is a searching, thorough review of a critical set of problems in American policy, including those relating to Iran and terrorism. Hopefully it will help to engender a re-thinking of priorities and the kind of policy changes that Obama speaks of but has not yet brought about.
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