CLAPPER ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE(IRAN,LIBYA MANPADS, ETC.)FEB.16,2012
HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE
CURRENT AND FUTURE WORLDWIDE
THREATS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF
THE UNITED STATES
http://armed-services.senate.gov/Transcripts/2012/02%20February/12-03%20-%202-16-12.pdf
...Proliferation, that is, efforts to develop, acquire, or spread weapons
of mass destruction, is also a major global strategic threat.
Among nation states, as you have alluded, Iran’s technical advances,
particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthen our assessment
that Iran is more than capable of producing enough highly
enriched uranium for a weapon if its political leaders, specifically
the Supreme Leader himself, chooses to do so.
STATEMENT OF LTG RONALD L. BURGESS, JR., USA,
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
...To the west, Iran remains committed to threatening U.S. interests
in the region through its support to terrorists and militant
groups, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, while it remains committed
to strengthening its naval, nuclear, and missile capabilities.
Iran can close the Straits of Hormuz at least temporarily and may
launch missiles against United States forces and our allies in the
region if it is attacked. Iran could also attempt to employ terrorist
surrogates worldwide. However, the agency assesses Iran as unlikely
to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict.
Iranian ballistic missiles in development could range across the
region and Central Europe. Iran’s new space launch vehicle demonstrates
progress toward a potential ICBM. Iran today has the
technical, scientific, and industrial capability to eventually produce
nuclear weapons. While international pressure against Iran has increased,
including through sanctions, we assess that Tehran is not
close to agreeing to abandoning its nuclear program.
...Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Burgess.
Let us try 7 minutes for a first round, and I hope that there will
be time for a second round.
Director Clapper’s prepared statement said the following in
terms of the Intelligence Community’s assessment about Iran’s nuclear
program: ‘‘We assess Iran as keeping open the option to develop
nuclear weapons should it choose to do so. We do not know,
however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.’’
And his statement also said that we judge Iran’s nuclear decisionmaking
as guided by a cost-benefit approach which offers the international
community opportunities to influence Tehran.
General Burgess, do you agree with that statement of Director
Clapper in his prepared statement?
General BURGESS. Yes, sir. Sir, I think it would be very consistent
with what the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and myself,
along with a couple of other witnesses, stated before this committee
almost a year and a half ago.
Chairman LEVIN. Director Clapper, I understand that what you
have said—and now General Burgess agrees with—is that Iran has
not yet decided to develop nuclear weapons. Is that correct? Is that
still your assessment?
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir. That is the Intelligence Community’s
assessment that that is an option that is still held out by the Iranians
and we believe the decision would be made by the Supreme
Leader himself and he would base that on a cost-benefit analysis
in terms of—I do not think he would want a nuclear weapon at any
price. So that, I think, plays to the value of sanctions, particularly
the recent ratcheting up of more sanctions in anticipation that that
will induce a change in their policy and behavior.
Chairman LEVIN. And it is the Intelligence Community’s assessment
that sanctions and other international pressure actually
could—not will necessarily, but could—influence Iran in its decision
as to whether to proceed.
Director CLAPPER. Absolutely, sir. Of course, the impacts that the
sanctions are already having on the Iranian economy, the devaluation
of their currency, the difficulty they are having in engaging
in banking transactions, which will, of course, increase with the recent
provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act. And so
to the extent that the Iranian population becomes restive and if the
regime then feels threatened in terms of its stability and tenure,
the thought is that that could change their policy.
I think it is interesting that they have apparently asked the EU
for resumption of the Five Plus One dialogue, and of course, there
is another meeting coming up, another engagement with the International
Atomic Energy Administration. So we will see whether the
Iranians may be changing their mind.
Chairman LEVIN. Well, I must tell you I am skeptical about putting
any significance in that, but nonetheless, it is not my testimony
that we are here to hear. It is your testimony and it is obviously
important testimony.
Director Clapper, in a recent interview, Defense Secretary Panetta
said that if Iran decides to pursue a nuclear weapon capability,
?it would probably take them about a year to be able to
produce a bomb and then possibly another 1 or 2 years in order to
put it on a deliverable vehicle of some sort in order to deliver that
weapon.? Do you disagree with Defense Secretary Panetta’s assessment?
Director CLAPPER. No, sir, I do not disagree, and particularly
with respect to the year, that is, I think, technically feasible but
practically not likely. There are all kinds of combinations and permutations
that could affect how long it might take should the Iranians
make a decision to pursue a nuclear weapon, how long that
might take. I think the details of that are best—it is rather complex
and arcane and sensitive because of how we know this—left
to a closed session discussion.
Chairman LEVIN. You say that the year is perhaps right, but it
is more likely that it would take longer. Was that the implication
of your—
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Now, a Washington Post columnist recently
wrote that a senior administration official believes that an Israeli strike against Iran was likely this spring. General Burgess, in the
view of the Intelligence Community, has Israel decided to attack
Iran?
General BURGESS. Sir, to the best of our knowledge, Israel has
not decided to attack Iran.
...Senator MCCAIN. We are seeing a very intriguing kind of situation
evolve here. There have been what is believed to be Iranian
attacks or attempts to attack worldwide: in the United States in
the case of the Saudi ambassador, Georgia, India—the explosions
there. Now today we read about Thailand. Does this tell us a number
of things, including the extent of the Iranian worldwide terrorist
network, and does this also tell us that there is a covert conflict
or war going on between Israel and Iran?
Director CLAPPER. Well, I think Iran is—well, there are two dimensions
of this. I think on the one count, they feel somewhat
under siege. On the other hand, they are sort of feeling their oats.
Through the Iranian lens, they probably view Arab Spring as a
good thing and opportunities for them to exploit, which thus far
have not worked to their favor. So they, through their proxies, the
IRGC particularly, decided—made a conscious judgment to reach
out against primarily Israeli and then secondarily against U.S. interests.
Senator MCCAIN. And they are displaying some capabilities.
Director CLAPPER. Well, yes, sir, to a certain extent. Even though
the attacks that you reference were not successful in case they
blew one of their own up, but they regard those as successful be- cause of the psychological impact they have in each one of the
countries.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Director Clapper, General Burgess, thanks for your really extraordinary
leadership of the Intelligence Community and all you
do to protect our security.
Director Clapper, I want to just go back to Iran for a couple of
minutes quickly. You said this morning that it is your assessment
or the IC’s assessment that Iran has not made a decision to build
a nuclear weapon. But I assume you also believe, based on International
Atomic Energy Agency reports and information that the
Intelligence Community has, that Iran has taken steps to put them
in a position to make a decision to break out and build a nuclear
weapon.
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir. That is a good characterization. There
also are certain things they have not yet done, which I would be
happy to discuss in closed session, that would be key indicators
that they have made such a decision.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. But they have done things—is it fair to
say—that are inconsistent with just wanting to have peaceful nuclear
energy capacity?
Director CLAPPER. Well, obviously, the issue here is the extent to
which they produce highly enriched uranium. They have produced
small amounts of 20 percent highly enriched uranium which ostensibly
could be used for legitimate peaceful purposes. So if they go
beyond that, obviously, that would be a negative indicator. I will
put it that way.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.
General Burgess, do you want to add to that at all?
General BURGESS. Well, sir, I would agree with what Director
Clapper said, but sir, I would agree with your characterization because
of the movement from the 3.5 to the 20 percent enrichment.
That is already a leap and it is not that much of a bigger leap to
the bigger 90 percent that they would need to go to.
Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Thank you.
And do you both agree or is it your assessment that if Iran
makes a decision to build a nuclear weapons capability and, in fact,
achieves it, that it is likely to set off a nuclear arms race within
the region; in other words, that other countries, Saudi Arabia, for
instance, will want to also have a nuclear weapons capacity?
Director CLAPPER. Well, it is certainly a possibility, sir. Absolutely.
Senator LIEBERMAN. And is it also fair to say—and we have
talked about the Iranian sponsorship of terrorism—that if they did
have nuclear weapons capability, it might well embolden them in
their use of terrorism against regional opponents and even the
United States?
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir. It would serve as a deterrent. Even
I think to a certain extent the ambiguity that exists now serves as
a deterrent and does serve to help embolden them.
Senator INHOFE. Oh, you did? That was a good one, General.
I think we pretty much have decided on this 20 percent, getting
back to Iran now, that it is something that is either achieved or
is being achieved as we talk. And, General Burgess, you said we
have the scientific, technical, and industrial capabilities of producing
a weapon. We did not really talk about when. ?When? is the
big issue.
Senator GRAHAM. Over time, okay.
Let us go to Iran. Keep this at the 30,000-foot view. The regime’s
goal, do you not think, is survival? Right? Do you both agree with
that?
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir.
Senator GRAHAM. Do you think they have made a decision that
maybe the best way to survive is to develop a nuclear weapon?
Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, we have said consistently that they
will base this on a cost-benefit analysis.
Senator GRAHAM. Do you think they are trying to develop a nuclear
weapon? Do you think that is their goal?
Director CLAPPER. They are putting themselves—they are sustaining
the industrial infrastructure to enable them, if they make
that decision. Yes, sir.
Senator GRAHAM. Do you think they are building these power
plants for peaceful nuclear power generation purposes?
Senator GRAHAM. Do you have doubt about the Iranians’ intention
when it comes to making a nuclear weapon?
Director CLAPPER. I do.
Senator GRAHAM. So you are not so sure they are trying to make
a bomb.
Director CLAPPER. I am sorry?
Senator GRAHAM. You doubt whether or not they are trying to
create a nuclear bomb?
Director CLAPPER. I think they are keeping themselves in a position
to make that decision, but there are certain things they have
not yet done and have not done for some time.
Senator GRAHAM. How would we know when they have made
that decision?
Director CLAPPER. I am happy to discuss that with you in closed
session.
Senator GRAHAM. Well, I guess my point is that I take a different
view. I am very convinced that they are going down the road of developing
a nuclear weapon. I cannot read anyone’s mind, but it
seems logical to me that they believe if they get a nuclear weapon,
they will become North Korea and nobody really in the future is
going to bother them.
Let us talk about nuclear capability in the hands of the Iranians.
Is that a good outcome for United States national security interests
if they were able nuclear capability?
Director CLAPPER. Obviously not to have a nuclear weapon and
the means of delivering it.
Senator GRAHAM. Right.
The reason being, it would create a nuclear arms race most likely
in the Mideast.
Director CLAPPER. That is certainly a potential and likely outcome.
Senator GRAHAM. Arab Sunni states would not take kindly to
Persian Shias having a nuclear trump card.
Director CLAPPER. Correct.
Senator GRAHAM. And the likelihood of a terrorist organization
being able to access nuclear materials in the hands of the Iranian
ayatollahs would be greater, not less. Would you not think?
Director CLAPPER. Probably so, and of course, that is the nexus
of a terrorist group and weapons of mass destruction—
Senator GRAHAM. So when President Obama says it is unacceptable
for the Iranians to achieve nuclear capability, do you agree
with that?
Director CLAPPER. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator GRAHAM. Congress is about to introduce a resolution
that says containment of a nuclear-capable Iran is not a good national
security strategy. So we are going to be backing up the
President, and I am glad to hear you agree with that proposition,
that we should not as a Nation try to contain a nuclear-capable
Iran. We should try to prevent it. And as you said, sanctions may
work. I hope they do. I am not in the camp of believing that all
is lost.
Do you also believe that all options should remain on the table
when it comes to stopping them from getting a nuclear capability?
Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, that is a personal view. That is not
the Intelligence Community’s—you know, we do not——
Senator GRAHAM. Just personally.
Director CLAPPER.—policy, but certainly I do.
Senator GRAHAM. Yes. That is what the President said and I certainly
agree with him.
...Senator HAGAN. What about your assessment of what happened
to all the stockpiles of conventional weapons such as missile and
artillery?
Director CLAPPER. Well, the principal area of concern, of course,
are the so-called MANPADs, or shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons,
and the estimate was, going into the upheavals there, of about
20,000 MANPADs. In fact, Libya had more MANPADs than any
non-producing country in the world.
There has been an active and aggressive program run by the
State Department to recover MANPADs, and through that program,
the estimate—they have recovered about a quarter of them,
about 5,000 MANPADs. There are some number of others that
were probably destroyed in the course of the air campaign that
were in depots and other storage places, but the truth is that
MANPADs and other weapons are distributed all over the place, in
homes, in factories, in schoolhouses. It is all over. So there is a concern,
obviously, about recovery of these weapons.
...But I just want to ask you when 20 percent of the world’s oil supply
transits the Straits of Hormuz, what is the impact on oil prices
of the geopolitical issues that we see in the Middle East. In other
words, does the threat of a possible action by Israel against Iran
and possible retaliation, which would include a blockade of the
Strait of Hormuz, affect worldwide oil prices?
Director CLAPPER. Well, yes, sir, it does and, of course, for the
reasons you cite, if the strait were blocked, that would have profound
impact not only in the region but in the rest of the world.
It would have great impact, obviously, on the price of oil. And of
course, that is one thing we have to manage very carefully with the
NDAA provisions on imposing more sanctions on Iran so that we
do not end up in the worst of both worlds. But you are quite right.
It is a very delicate balance here and clearly would have impacts
on the price of oil and the world economy.
Senator CORNYN. And a blockade of the Straits of Hormuz, because
of the blockade of the oil trade—would you see that that
would have a negative impact not only on the global economy in terms of the projections of growth—and what I am getting at is, obviously,
we are coming out of a very tough patch and projections
by the Congressional Budget Office and the Federal Reserve are for
a relatively slow rate of growth and higher unemployment here for
the next several years. And I just would like to get your impressions
of the possibility of a blockade—what that would do in terms
of the rate of expected growth of our economy here and related topics.
Director CLAPPER. Well, sir, I would have to take that one under
advisement. I am not an economist, and I would want the experts
to—if there is the possibility for projecting what the impacts would
be globally on the economy and individually, and it would vary
from country to country depending on how dependent they are on
oil that transits the strait. But I think the general answer is it is
hard to see a good effect for any number of reasons if a blockade
were allowed to stand.
...Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Director Clapper and General Burgess, for being
here. I hate to keep you past the noon hour, so I will try and be
quick.
Last year, in the midst of the Libyan operation, Senator Collins
and I wrote to the administration expressing our concerns that I
know you share about Libya’s vast arsenal of unsecured manned
portable air defense systems, MANPADs. And considering that
these pose a continuing threat and there are an estimated 20,000
still out there, I am not going to ask you to speak to that because
we asked that the Intelligence Committee give us a report as part
of the NDAA authorization. And I just wanted to say that I look
forward to hearing from you about that subject because it is clearly
going continue to be a concern.
Director CLAPPER. It is a concern. And you are quite right about
the estimate, the all-source estimate we had before the anti-
Qaddafi demonstrations started of about 20,000 MANPADs in
Libya. The State Department is managing an aggressive program
to recover MANPADs, and to this point it recovered about 25 percent
of them, about 5,000. There are many others that we are certain,
although we cannot count them all, that were destroyed by
virtue of the fact they were in ammo depots and bunkers and this
sort of thing that were destroyed during either the contest between
the opposition and regime or the NATO air strikes. That said,
there is a large number that are unlocated and will be very problematic
in recovering since they have them all over the place. Libya
was awash in weaponry.
So we will continue with the program to do what we can to either
account for the ones destroyed or damaged during the demonstrations
and encounters and, as well, continue, I would guess, with
the recovery program that the State Department team is running.
...Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
I have a few questions which may be the beginning and the end
of round two, depending if any other Senators arrive.
First, in response to a question about how long an Israeli military
attack on Iran would postpone Iran getting a bomb, Secretary
of Defense Panetta said, ‘‘that at best it might postpone it maybe
1, possibly 2 years’’. Does the Intelligence Community agree with
that?
Director CLAPPER. Well, I do not disagree with it, but I think
there is a lot of factors that could play here. How effective such an
attack was, what the targets were, what the rate of recovery might
be. So there is a lot of imponderables there that could affect a
guesstimate—and that is all it is—about how long it would take to
resume.
Chairman LEVIN. Has the Intelligence Community made an estimate
of that issue, how long it would take to resume after an
Israeli military attack?
Director CLAPPER. We have not come up with a single number for
the reasons I just kind of alluded to. It would be hard to come up
with a number because it would have to be an assessment as well
how well the Iranians could recover and how much damage—how
effective the attack was.
Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Now, you indicated that our Intelligence
Community and the Israeli Intelligence Community are aligned on
issues relative to Iran. Do the Israelis agree with you that Iran has
not made a decision as to whether or not to have a nuclear weapon?
Do you they agree with that?
Director CLAPPER. I am happy to discuss that with you in closed
session, sir.
...Senator PORTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I will not prolong this because it looks like I may be
between you and a much-deserved break for lunch.
First of all, thank you for your testimony today. I had two other
hearings. So I bounced around a little.
But I got to hear some of the opening and I also listened to Senator
McCain and his opening. He talked a little about the increasing
reports of a link between al Qaeda and Iran. And, Director
Clapper, last year the Treasury Department designated a number
of high-ranking members of al Qaeda who operate a facilitation
network from inside of Iran. There was a press release announcing
the designations from David Cohen, the Under Secretary. He
says—and I quote—Iran is the leading sponsor of state-sponsored
terrorism in the world today. By exposing Iran’s secret deal with
al Qaeda and allowing it to funnel funds and operatives through
its territory, we are illuminating yet another aspect of Iran’s unmatched
support for terrorism. That is a pretty troubling statement.
What is your understanding of this secret deal, so- called, between
Iran and al Qaeda?
Director CLAPPER. Iran and al Qaeda have had sort of a, to a certain
extent, shotgun marriage. I think Iran has harbored al Qaeda
leaders, facilitators but under house arrest conditions, remembering
of course that Iran is a Shia state and al Qaeda is Sunni.
So they do not agree ideologically in the first place. I think Iran,
of course, pays attention to our pursuit of al Qaeda and what we
have done in Afghanistan and Iraq, next door neighbors to them.
So on the one hand, they have had this sort of standoff arrangement
with al Qaeda allowing them to exist there but not to foment
any operations directly from Iran because they are very sensitive
about, hey, we might come after them there as well. So it has been
this longstanding, as I say, kind of shotgun marriage or a marriage
of convenience. I think probably the Iranians may think that they
might use perhaps al Qaeda in the future as a surrogate or proxy.
Senator PORTMAN. Would they think, Mr. Director, that they
might use them as a hedge against an attack from the West?
Director CLAPPER. That is what I meant. They may have that in
mind for future use, but I think for now—and the history has been
that they have not allowed them to operate freely in Iran.
Senator PORTMAN. And you think they have not allowed them to
conduct operations using Iran as a platform.
Director CLAPPER. I do not think they have, sir, not directly, not
in the sense, say, by core al Qaeda in Pakistan.
Western spy agencies for years have kept watch on a craggy peak in northwest Iran that houses of one the world’s most unusual nuclear sites. Known as Fordow, the facility is built into mountain bunkers designed to withstand aerial attack. Iran’s civil-defense chief has declared the site “impregnable.”
But impregnable it is not, say U.S. military planners who are increasingly confident of their ability to deliver a serious blow against Fordow, should the president ever order an attack.
U.S. officials say they have no imminent plan to bombard the site, and they have cautioned that an American attack — or one by its closest Middle Eastern ally, Israel — risks devastating consequences such as soaring oil prices, Iranian retaliation and dramatically heightened tension in a fragile region.
Yet as a matter of physics, Fordow remains far more vulnerable than generally portrayed, said current and former military and intelligence analysts. Massive new “bunker buster” munitions recently added to the U.S. arsenal would not necessarily have to penetrate the deepest bunkers to cause irreparable damage to infrastructure as well as highly sensitive nuclear equipment, likely setting back Iran’s program by years, officials said.
The weapons’ capabilities are likely to factor in discussions with a stream of Israelis leaders arriving in Washington over the next week. The Obama administration will seek to assure the visitors, including Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, of U.S. resolve to stop Iran if it decides to build a nuclear bomb. White House officials are worried that Israel may launch a preemptive strike against Iran with little or no warning, a move U.S. officials argue would be do little to stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions and may in fact deepen Iran’s determination to become a nuclear state.
In arguing their case, U.S. officials acknowledged some uncertainty over whether even the Pentagon’s newest “bunker-buster” weapon — called the Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP — could pierce in a single blow the subterranean chambers where Iran is making enriched uranium. But they said a sustained U.S. attack over multiple days would probably render the plant unusable by collapsing tunnels and irreparably damaging both its highly sensitive centrifuge equipment and the miles of pipes, tubes and wires required to operate it.
“Hardened facilities require multiple sorties,” said a former senior intelligence official who has studied the formerly secret Fordow site and agreed to discuss sensitive details of U.S. strike capabilities on the condition of anonymity. “The question is, how many turns do you get at the apple?”
U.S. confidence has been reinforced by training exercises in which bombers assaulted similar targets in deeply buried bunkers and mountain tunnels, the officials and experts said.
U.S. officials have raised the necessity of multiple strikes as they warn Israel against a unilateral strike against Iran’s nuclear installations, the officials said. While Israel is capable of launching its own bunker-buster bombs against Fordow, it lacks both the United States’ more advanced munitions and the capability of waging a sustained bombing campaign over days and weeks, U.S. officials and analysts said.
The U.S.-Israeli rift over the urgency of stopping Iran’s nuclear progress stems in part from the belief among some Israeli officials that their window for successfully attacking Iran’s nuclear installations is rapidly closing as it moves key assets into bunkers. Barak, in a speech this month, spoke of Iran’s progress in creating a “zone of immunity” for its nuclear program.
To U.S. military planners, the “zone of immunity,” if it exists at all, is still years away. The Obama administration, while not ruling out a future strike, regards military action as a last resort, preferring to allow more time for changing Iran’s behavior through economic and political pressure.
U.S. officials also remain unconvinced that Iran has decided to build a nuclear bomb, though they believe it is pursuing the capacity to do so. Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful energy production.
Fordow is in the barren hills of northwestern Iran just outside Qom, the ancient city that is the spiritual home of the 1979 revolutionary movement. U.S. intelligence officials believe that tunneling began nearly a decade ago for what was intended to be a secret uranium enrichment site that would operate parallel to the country’s much larger, declared enrichment plant at Natanz.
The CIA began monitoring the site at least four years ago, and in 2009, President Obama, flanked by other world leaders, publicly exposed the partially built facility and demanded that Iran come clean about its intentions.
Iran acknowledged that it was building a second uranium-enrichment plant and soon allowed the International Atomic Energy Agency in for a visit. The U.N. inspectors saw a series of chambers built into the side of a mountain and connected by tunnels with thick walls and blast-proof doors. Some of the bunkers were protected by as much 200 to 300 feet of mountain.
The underground plant — not yet fully operational — is relatively small, with space for only about 3,000 centrifuges, compared with the tens of thousands planned for Natanz. But analysts say it’s big enough to process the enriched uranium necessary for at least one nuclear weapon a year, should Iran decide to build them.
Iran started enriching uranium in the Fordow plant in January. A report by U.N. inspectors last week confirmed that the plant is making a purer form of enriched uranium that can be relatively easily converted to weapons-grade fuel.
Iran has publicly defended Fordow’s unusually robust fortification, citing repeated threats by Israel to destroy the country’s nuclear program.
Western analysts believe Fordow has not only the protection afforded by natural rock but also additional hardening that draws on North Korean bunker-building expertise. A report last week by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank, said the facility was believed to include multiple “blast-proof doors, extensive divider walls, hardened ceilings, 20-centimeter-thick concrete walls, and double concrete ceilings with earth filled between layers.”
“Such passive defenses could have a major impact” in blunting the impact of an aerial bombardment, said the report, written by Anthony Cordesman, a former director of intelligence assessment at the Defense Department and now the holder of CSIS’s Arleigh A. Burke Chair in strategy.
Cordesman acknowledged that reports about such fortification “are often premature, exaggerated, or report far higher construction standards than are actually executed.”
Still, current and former U.S. officials acknowledge that Fordow’s fortifications far exceed those of other facilities encountered in other conflicts, including the al-Taji bunkers that shielded Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein’s command posts on the eve of the 2003 Iraq invasion.
Against such a target, the United States has an array of conventional bunker-busting weapons. They include the 5,000-pound BLU-122, capable of penetrating more than 20 feet of concrete or 100 feet of earth before detonating, as well as the far more powerful Massive Ordnance Penetrator, or MOP, a 30,000-pound titan that can be delivered by the country’s largest strategic bombers. Although the weapon’s precise capabilities are classified, the MOP is estimated to be capable of boring through up to 200 feet of dirt and rock before exploding.
The Pentagon is investing tens of millions of dollars to further enhance the MOP’s explosive punch and concrete-piercing capabilities. Some also note that the weapon’s performance is partly dependent on geology, particularly the type and density of the rock through which the bomb passes.
It’s impossible to know precisely what the impact of a bomb would be against such a difficult target. Certainly, U.S. warplanes would set back Iran’s nuclear efforts, said Michael Eisenstadt, a former military adviser to the State Department and Pentagon.
But for how long?
“You never really know until you do it,” said Eisenstadt, director of Military and Security Studies for the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. “We’re so close to the outer limits of technology that it becomes a roll of the dice.”
Yet, ultimately, the ability to destroy the Fordow does not depend on whether a bomb physically penetrates the cavern where Iran’s centrifuges are operating, several analysts said.
“There are good outcomes short of destroying” the centrifuge hall, Cordesman said in an interview. Strikes against more accessible targets — from tunnel entrances and air shafts to power and water systems — can effectively knock the plant out of action. Repeated strikes will also make Iran fearful of attempting to repair the damage, he added.
Other analysts stressed the particular vulnerability of centrifuges, machines that spin at supersonic speeds to purify uranium gas into the enriched form usable in nuclear applications. Almost anything that upsets delicately balanced machines — from shock waves and debris to power disruptions — can render them useless, said one former Pentagon official who also requested anonymity in discussing potential Iranian targets.
“If you can target the one piece of critical equipment instead of the whole thing, isn’t that just as good?” the official said. “Even by reducing the entrances to rubble, you’ve effectively entombed the site.”
